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How is it Possible That a Container Ship Collided with a USN Destroyer Near Japan?


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UPDATE

Troubling US Navy review finds widespread shortfalls in basic seamanship

 

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/06/06/troubling-us-navy-review-finds-widespread-shortfalls-in-basic-seamanship/

 

 

In the case of Fitzgerald, both the bridge and the combat information center showed a lack of basic understanding of the radar they were using and failed to use the tools at hand effectively. As a result, the surface fleet increased radar training at its nine-week basic division officer course from two hours to 11 hours, the message said

 

 

Wow! Increase radar training from 2 to 11 hours - 9-weeks of basic training. These guys are driving ships worth far more than fighter planes that carry hundreds (thousands) of people versus 2, yet pilots receive hundreds of times more training than they do. I'm not aware of all of the other training that Navy officers get, but this article gives the impression that the Navy skimps on training given the responsibility that these people have.

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UPDATE

Troubling US Navy review finds widespread shortfalls in basic seamanship

 

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/06/06/troubling-us-navy-review-finds-widespread-shortfalls-in-basic-seamanship/

 

 

In the case of Fitzgerald, both the bridge and the combat information center showed a lack of basic understanding of the radar they were using and failed to use the tools at hand effectively. As a result, the surface fleet increased radar training at its nine-week basic division officer course from two hours to 11 hours, the message said

 

 

Wow! Increase radar training from 2 to 11 hours - 9-weeks of basic training. These guys are driving ships worth far more than fighter planes that carry hundreds (thousands) of people versus 2, yet pilots receive hundreds of times more training than they do. I'm not aware of all of the other training that Navy officers get, but this article gives the impression that the Navy skimps on training given the responsibility that these people have.

 

By no means an expert, my Naval time was long, long ago. A SWO (surface warfare officer) who only has had the B-DOC (basic division officer course) would be standing a JOOD (junior officer of the deck) watch at sea under a fully qualified OOD. The OOD has a few more years of experience, and the 8 week A-DOC (advanced division officer course) as well.

 

Unfortunately, the Navy system requires that SWO's learn all aspects of ship operation, so junior officers get moved around a lot, being assigned to division officer slots in engineering, deck, weapons, etc. Here is a good article that shows how some SWO's can have limited "hands on" time due to limited sea days:

 

http://forum.gcaptain.com/t/navy-ood-officer-of-the-deck-qualifications-and-experience/45569

 

By no means criticizing the Navy method, as their requirements are totally different from merchant service, but let me give some comparisons.

 

Your typical brand new Third Officer on a merchant ship has had between 120-300 sea days before his first watch underway. Some Naval officers, particularly NROTC graduates have little to no sea time before commissioning. On the other hand, the Third Officer is immediately placed in charge of the vessel, while the new SWO serves under a senior officer on watch. Typically, a new 3/O will be placed on a watch where the Captain is awake and can monitor his/her performance daily.

 

I didn't know that SWO's only received a 2 hour course in radar. The international STCW (Standards of Training, Competency, and Watchkeeping) requires a 40 hour course to become certified, and then retesting every 5 years.

 

Your comparison to aviators isn't quite accurate. Naval aviators take a 6 week indoctrination course, and then start basic flight training. You can consider basic flight, and all further training to be "on the job training", since it involves actually flying the aircraft they are training to master. Yes, there is class work as well, but the real training is "hands on".

 

For a SWO, that "hands on" training is standing a watch on a ship, either as a JOOD, a CONN (conning officer, another junior watch officer position), or as a qualified OOD.

 

The difference is that the pilot can get plenty of flight hours as his aircraft is readily maintained, and crew training consists only of the actual flight crew. For the SWO, as noted in the gcaptain article, there are limited numbers of days of actual at sea time, and crew training can entail hundreds.

 

Is there a problem with the Navy's SWO training program? Yep. Will these measures help? Yep. Will these measures get SWO's to the "sweet spot" in training and experience (maximum effectiveness at minimum time)? Time will tell.

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UPDATE

Troubling US Navy review finds widespread shortfalls in basic seamanship

 

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/06/06/troubling-us-navy-review-finds-widespread-shortfalls-in-basic-seamanship/

 

 

In the case of Fitzgerald, both the bridge and the combat information center showed a lack of basic understanding of the radar they were using and failed to use the tools at hand effectively. As a result, the surface fleet increased radar training at its nine-week basic division officer course from two hours to 11 hours, the message said

 

 

Wow! Increase radar training from 2 to 11 hours - 9-weeks of basic training. These guys are driving ships worth far more than fighter planes that carry hundreds (thousands) of people versus 2, yet pilots receive hundreds of times more training than they do. I'm not aware of all of the other training that Navy officers get, but this article gives the impression that the Navy skimps on training given the responsibility that these people have.

 

Wow, 11 hrs radar training. It also depends whether that is radar theory or practical. I don't for a second believe this is all the training they receive.

 

Having served on UK & Canadian ships for almost 40 years, I was a cadet for 3 years, learning on the job from the officers. At college we learned radar theory/reflection plotter techniques and also attended multiple radar/simulator courses - each lasted about 2 weeks.

 

On commercial ships, you also receive a period of familiarisation, prior to assuming a position on a new ship, learning how to use the specific models and equipment installed on that ship.

 

Marine training is not as detailed and thorough as the airline industry, but I suspect the US Navy would have similar levels of training for the Bridge Officers that I experienced.

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Putting on my Black Shoes & wash kaki's ....

 

As a long obsolete Surface Warfare Officer, I have been following discussions in US Naval Institute's Proceedings, and other open publications.

 

It appears that today's SWO's [Ensign] entering the fleet have dramatically less training and even simulated hands on experience than back in the cold war days [Reagan Administration]. Dedicated school and classroom time has been replaced with self study, DVD based correspondence courses.

 

Apparently training time both for officers and other bridge watch standers [OS, QM, BN ratings] has been slighted. Reading between the lines, a principal failing is not that the watch standers lost the picture - it is that they did not have a mental model of the relative motions, and depended on misreading the information displayed by the available instrumentation.

 

On one of the ships [Fitzgerald ?] this was compounded my not recognizing that the control station the helmsman was trying to use was not the one with rudder control.

 

I'm glad that I am not one of the folks targeted to fix this, the only guarantee is that there is no simple solution.

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That 11 hours is (presumably concentrated) dedicated classroom hours.

 

Before standing watch as OOD, a junior officer will have stood CIC watches - essentially focused on monitoring, analyzing and passing on recommendations to the bridge based largely on radar-generated information. Then he will have stood many hours as JOOD - essentially on-the-job training putting classroom theory into practice.

 

Obviously, the captain deemed unqualified officers eligible to serve as OOD -- and Fleet Command permitted careless officers to command ships.

 

A lot went wrong: probably all the way from E-3 lookouts and E-4 Radarmen to admirals not performing appropriate duties at acceptable levels.

 

Greater investment in formal training and practical sea time is obviously needed - not just one quick fix.

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I wonder how able the navy will be to institute the needed changes. It's easy enough to suggest longer and more in depth training and practice, but that translates into many extra bodies needed to maintain operations.

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I wonder how able the navy will be to institute the needed changes. It's easy enough to suggest longer and more in depth training and practice, but that translates into many extra bodies needed to maintain operations.

 

Using the gcaptain article as a baseline (and it sounds about right to me), the ship is only actively deployed 7 out of 24 months. During the other 17 months, the ship is underway 1 week out of 8. The other 7 weeks every 2 months, the ship is tied to the pier. I would think that shipboard organization could cover for temporarily assigning officers to training schools during this time.

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Using the gcaptain article as a baseline (and it sounds about right to me), the ship is only actively deployed 7 out of 24 months. During the other 17 months, the ship is underway 1 week out of 8. The other 7 weeks every 2 months, the ship is tied to the pier. I would think that shipboard organization could cover for temporarily assigning officers to training schools during this time.

 

 

except thats not how 7Th fleet operates in real life. mr spook was on MCAIN during our time in Yokousuka, Stepson was on MUSTIN a decade later. that one week out of 8 was when they were pier side., not underway. ( I will discount the 6 months immediately following 9/11 when COWPENS was haze grey 4 straight months unscheduled)

 

whenever the squadron needed training, the Carrier went out. when the carrier went out, she had DDGs and FFGs playing plane guard. the squadron needed a lot of training some years.....

 

FTR mr spook is a non SWO SWO.. he was allowed to get his SWO pin during a small window of time when other Designators were allowed to cross qualify. ( last I heard that was no longer an option) but I will say this: on the day of his boards it was him and 3 other SWOs who were rapidly coming to the end of their 18 month window to qualify. after arriving to the ship. one of the SWOs did not pass. the other two squeaked by. he was immediately put on the Bridge watch rotation.

 

basically between all their running round being shunted to every department for a few weeks before being shoved onto the next one, combined with a lax attitude of self starting and a general 'babying' by senior Officers led to the crap discipline and standards that led to these tragedies.

 

20 years ago, it was the carrier Kitty Hawk failing an INSURV/Lighting off test that caught 7th Fleet with their pants down and led to a lot of firings and a shift in how things were done. apparently things are starting to slide that way again with no one standing up and demanding standards that are high enough to prevent this from happening.

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Putting on my Black Shoes & wash kaki's ....

 

As a long obsolete Surface Warfare Officer, I have been following discussions in US Naval Institute's Proceedings, and other open publications.

 

It appears that today's SWO's [Ensign] entering the fleet have dramatically less training and even simulated hands on experience than back in the cold war days [Reagan Administration]. Dedicated school and classroom time has been replaced with self study, DVD based correspondence courses.

 

Apparently training time both for officers and other bridge watch standers [OS, QM, BN ratings] has been slighted. Reading between the lines, a principal failing is not that the watch standers lost the picture - it is that they did not have a mental model of the relative motions, and depended on misreading the information displayed by the available instrumentation.

 

On one of the ships [Fitzgerald ?] this was compounded my not recognizing that the control station the helmsman was trying to use was not the one with rudder control.

 

I'm glad that I am not one of the folks targeted to fix this, the only guarantee is that there is no simple solution.

 

Wow, I find the lack of actual training astounding - self study & correspondence courses don't make navigators with situational awareness.

 

Ship owners are well known for being cheap, but P&O/Princess paid me for over 3 years as a cadet. This included the minimum 24 months sea time + 6 months accelerated college time, additional courses and a monthly college correspondence course that was submitted every month we were at sea. Completion of that program permitted me to sail as Junior Officer on a passenger ship. During my extensive training, I experienced numerous situations that prepared me for my many years in command of ro/pax vessels. You just can't learn these things in college or from DVD's.

 

In Canada, prospective officers went to marine school for 6 months and everyone thought they could walk into a 2nd officers job on a 20 kt 20,000 ton coastal ferry. Leaving school with a watchkeeping certificate, most had acquired the skills of a 2nd trip cadet.

 

In addition to actually providing hands on training the Navy should review the Bridge procedures of many of the top commercial companies. It started in the airline industry, with cockpit resource management and has change names on the marine side to Bridge Resource Management or Bridge Team Command & Control. Many companies also have extensive in-house simulators, with officers having annual refreshers.

 

Modern highly integrated bridge systems remove many of the old manual tasks, but you need a degree in buttonology to work it all. For ECDIS we were provide a full week of training. I assume the Navy bridges have integrated systems, as I first experienced them over 20 years ago.

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