USA grounds 737 MAX 8 & 9

[GeezerCouple]

planes in the air may continue to destination, and then are grounded.

 

Interesting how Elaine Chao flew (yesterday? day before) on one to show that she had complete confidence in safety.

 

 

[rkacruiser]

The similarities in what public reports that I have read between the Lion Air tragedy and the Ethiopian Airlines crash possible flight control issues are too similar to be taken lightly.  This reminds me of the Air France A 330  on a Trans-Atlantic flight from Brazil to Paris a few years ago that was due to a failure of an electronic sensor that splashed into the Atlantic with no survivors.

[Ashland]

Very disturbing but not surprising that who our "leader" wanted to head up the FAA was his personal pilot....who flew a (Trump) plane that for a time wasn't even registered.

[Globaliser]

11 hours ago, rkacruiser said:

This reminds me of the Air France A 330  on a Trans-Atlantic flight from Brazil to Paris a few years ago that was due to a failure of an electronic sensor that splashed into the Atlantic with no survivors.

 

No, that really wasn't the reason for the Air France accident. From what little is known, there is one possible similarity between that accident and the Ethiopian accident, but it was nothing to do with the aircraft and it is far too early to know whether this is anything other than a possibility which needs to be looked at.

[Flymia]

13 hours ago, rkacruiser said:

The similarities in what public reports that I have read between the Lion Air tragedy and the Ethiopian Airlines crash possible flight control issues are too similar to be taken lightly.  This reminds me of the Air France A 330  on a Trans-Atlantic flight from Brazil to Paris a few years ago that was due to a failure of an electronic sensor that splashed into the Atlantic with no survivors.

The Air France 447 crash was 90% pilot error. 

 

The MAX clearly has an issue, however, its an issue that supposedly has appropriate response to be inputed by the pilots. While the issue needs to be resolved, I think both reports will indicate poor crew decisions as major factors in both crashes. The Lion Air incident also had maintenance  issues. 

 

We will see. I am sure Boeing is up 24/hr a day figuring out a fix 

Edited March 14, 2019 by Flymia

[Noxequifans]

On 3/14/2019 at 10:01 AM, Flymia said:

The Air France 447 crash was 90% pilot error. 

 

The MAX clearly has an issue, however, its an issue that supposedly has appropriate response to be inputed by the pilots. While the issue needs to be resolved, I think both reports will indicate poor crew decisions as major factors in both crashes. The Lion Air incident also had maintenance  issues. 

 

We will see. I am sure Boeing is up 24/hr a day figuring out a fix 

Agree .... interesting that the same aircraft flown in the US did not experience there fatal accidents.

[Globaliser]

38 minutes ago, Noxequifans said:

Agree .... interesting that the same aircraft flown in the US did not experience there fatal accidents.

 

As likely as not, just luck. Hopefully we will never have to find out whether US airline crew have the ability in similar circumstances to deal with whatever went wrong on either of the accident aircraft, even though we have sadly learned over the years of many US airline crew who failed to deal adequately with things that going wrong when they ought to have been able to deal with them.

[waterbug123]

16 hours ago, Noxequifans said:

Agree .... interesting that the same aircraft flown in the US did not experience there fatal accidents.

 

You forgot to add the word "yet" to the end of your post.  And now hopefully, it will become a moot point.

[slidergirl]

22 hours ago, Noxequifans said:

Agree .... interesting that the same aircraft flown in the US did not experience there fatal accidents.

 

But, there are pilots who DID report issues - they were reported to a Federal database used to record complaints.  They were about autopilot issues where the nose would be pointed down.  The plane was a "mod" to the 737, not considered a new build, so apparently no requirement to have any additional training.  So, it was up to individual airlines on what to do.  

 

 

[GeezerCouple]

1 minute ago, slidergirl said:

 

But, there are pilots who DID report issues - they were reported to a Federal database used to record complaints.  They were about autopilot issues where the nose would be pointed down.  The plane was a "mod" to the 737, not considered a new build, so apparently no requirement to have any additional training.  So, it was up to individual airlines on what to do.  

 

 

Also, wasn't there some additional sensor on the AA (American Airlines) version of their MAX?

I'm not sure if that would have given the pilots more notice OR if it might somehow have prevented/lessened the "over-ride" of the automated system that seems to have been implicated.

Apologies if I don't have all of this quite correct.

 

GC

[em-sk]

48 minutes ago, GeezerCouple said:

 

Also, wasn't there some additional sensor on the AA (American Airlines) version of their MAX?

I'm not sure if that would have given the pilots more notice OR if it might somehow have prevented/lessened the "over-ride" of the automated system that seems to have been implicated.

Apologies if I don't have all of this quite correct.

 

GC

 

The original issue was the automation (software) would drive the aircraft nose down under certain sensor failures.  This was a software feature that Boeing had not included in any of the material used to train the pilots.  For that reason it was unexpected on the Lion Air flight.  After that crash a notice was sent out to all the airline operating the aircraft advising them to tell their pilots about this "feature" and what to do if it occurs.   At take off and landing the aircraft is close to the ground and there is not a lot of time to respond.   

 

China, Europe, Japan (and most of the world except Canada and the US) grounded the aircraft nearly immediately after the second crash.  After satellite tracking data was available and showed the same pattern on the Ethiopian flight that waas enough for Canada to immediately closed its airspace to the 737 max.   That forced the hand of the US to do the same.

 

I think part of the reason for Canada and the US taking longer is both countries have large fleets of the aircraft.  In Canada (between Air Canada, WestJet, Sunwing) there are around 40 of these.  In the US (between SouthWest, American and United) there are around 70 aircraft.  The only country that would have more of these that Canada or the US is China.

 

Boeing is working on getting software updates out to the airlines to fix the problem that caused the Lion Air crash.  I suspect they will start flying after that.  The result of the Ethiopian crash will likely take months before there is a final answer.

 

 

[rkacruiser]

An ignorant thought, perhaps, about the solution of whatever the problem might be:  if the issue begins when the auto-pilot is engaged soon after take-off, why not engage the auto-pilot after the plane is at cruising altitude?

[FlyerTalker]

2 hours ago, rkacruiser said:

An ignorant thought, perhaps, about the solution of whatever the problem might be:  if the issue begins when the auto-pilot is engaged soon after take-off, why not engage the auto-pilot after the plane is at cruising altitude?

 

It's not the "autopilot" that is the subject of some interest...it's the MCAS which is an automatic trim system that is always engaged unless the crew manually overrides with a particular procedure.

 

 

[Globaliser]

 

7 hours ago, FlyerTalker said:

9 hours ago, rkacruiser said:

An ignorant thought, perhaps, about the solution of whatever the problem might be:  if the issue begins when the auto-pilot is engaged soon after take-off, why not engage the auto-pilot after the plane is at cruising altitude?

 

It's not the "autopilot" that is the subject of some interest...it's the MCAS which is an automatic trim system that is always engaged unless the crew manually overrides with a particular procedure.

 

If undesired operation of the MCAS was the underlying problem behind either or both the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines accidents, it's important to note that this is not an issue which "begins when the auto-pilot is engaged". MCAS operates only when the autopilot is disengaged.

[em-sk]

On 3/18/2019 at 1:49 AM, Globaliser said:

 

 

If undesired operation of the MCAS was the underlying problem behind either or both the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines accidents, it's important to note that this is not an issue which "begins when the auto-pilot is engaged". MCAS operates only when the autopilot is disengaged.

 

Looks like there are two other options that airlines could have included when ordering their aircraft that would have helped during this type of failure.

 

• Air Canada and American - has the extra indicator and the disagree light.
• WestJet and SouthWest only have the light.  However, Southwest starting to add the indicator on aircraft delivered after the Lion Air crash.
• United, Norwegian, Lion Air and Ethiopian did not include that option when ordering their aircraft. 

 https://www.ctvnews.ca/business/air-canada-westjet-purchased-safety-option-reportedly-missing-on-crashed-planes-1.4346085

Edited March 22, 2019 by em-sk

[GeezerCouple]

1 minute ago, em-sk said:

 

Looks like there are two other options that airlines could have included when ordering their aircraft that would have helped during this type of failure.

 

• Air Canada and American - has the extra indicator and the disagree light.
• WestJet and SouthWest only have the light.  However, Southwest starting to add the indicator on aircraft delivered after the Lion Air crash.
• United, Norwegian, Lion Air and Ethiopian did not include that option when ordering their aircraft. 

 https://www.ctvnews.ca/business/air-canada-westjet-purchased-safety-option-reportedly-missing-on-crashed-planes-1.4346085

 

Yup.

 

We "get it" about Boeing charging extra for fancier seats, or for additional lavs, etc.

 

But charging extra for SAFETY FEATURES?

Worse (or equally bad?), one of those only cost something under $7k per plane.

Of the huge price per plane... that critical safety feature wasn't *included*?

 

Sheesh!

 

GC

[Globaliser]

7 hours ago, GeezerCouple said:

But charging extra for SAFETY FEATURES?

Worse (or equally bad?), one of those only cost something under $7k per plane.

Of the huge price per plane... that critical safety feature wasn't *included*?

 

The indicators being talked about are not "critical safety features". Both their usefulness and their effectiveness are controversial. Of course, it will now be politically impossible for Boeing to continue to list these as options, but it is still an open question whether an AoA indicator or an AoA disagree warning light would have made any difference to either accident.

 

In particular, you have to distinguish between things which might have afforded the crew an opportunity to diagnose the flying problem when it arose and therefore apply the correct fix; and things which might have made a difference simply because they might have halted the flight altogether because of the airline's pre-flight procedures (after being re-written to take into account the fitting of one or other of these devices). It is not as simple as saying that if these pilots had had these devices, they would have instantly known what to do to fix the problem when it arose.

 

This is why these two devices will, at most, be ancillary to the main fix of the problem which appears to have resulted in the Lion Air accident.

 

Aviation is never as simple as it can appear to non-experts, including the non-expert media. After all, 737s have two AoA sensors, which could simply disagree - whereupon you might have to distrust both because you can't know which one is correct and which one is wrong. Airbus 320 family aircraft have three, and can work on a majority voting basis. Does that make the Airbus aircraft better, on the basis that one faulty sensor out of three will get outvoted and you will still have a correct reading from two? Tragically, Murphy always has a way of puncturing inadequate analysis.

[em-sk]

4 hours ago, Globaliser said:

 

The indicators being talked about are not "critical safety features". Both their usefulness and their effectiveness are controversial. Of course, it will now be politically impossible for Boeing to continue to list these as options, but it is still an open question whether an AoA indicator or an AoA disagree warning light would have made any difference to either accident.

 

In particular, you have to distinguish between things which might have afforded the crew an opportunity to diagnose the flying problem when it arose and therefore apply the correct fix; and things which might have made a difference simply because they might have halted the flight altogether because of the airline's pre-flight procedures (after being re-written to take into account the fitting of one or other of these devices). It is not as simple as saying that if these pilots had had these devices, they would have instantly known what to do to fix the problem when it arose.

 

This is why these two devices will, at most, be ancillary to the main fix of the problem which appears to have resulted in the Lion Air accident.

 

Aviation is never as simple as it can appear to non-experts, including the non-expert media. After all, 737s have two AoA sensors, which could simply disagree - whereupon you might have to distrust both because you can't know which one is correct and which one is wrong. Airbus 320 family aircraft have three, and can work on a majority voting basis. Does that make the Airbus aircraft better, on the basis that one faulty sensor out of three will get outvoted and you will still have a correct reading from two? Tragically, Murphy always has a way of puncturing inadequate analysis.

 

Agreed. It is complex.  Would the extra indicators have avoided the crash?  Probably not.  Would it have helped the pilots with situational awareness to understand what was going on and to take action.  Probably.  However procedures, training etc. would have had to also play a role. 

 

In principle a 2 out of 3 voting system is statistically better than a 1 out of 2 system assuming everything else is equal.  In this specific case there are to many other variables at play.  Everything else is not equal and only someone who has access to the detailed analysis can say.    

 

The Boeing 737 is also generally less automated than the Airbus aircraft.  Ironically, Airbus has far more software and automation in its aircraft.  

[nobog]

Both their usefulness and their effectiveness are controversial

 

Well, I've never heard that.  Its a physics thing. At to high a angle the wings loose lift - and you fall out of the sky, that's what the AoA (angle of attack) system tell you.  Pilots take this very seriously.

 

JK

Edited March 24, 2019 by nobog
font change

[Globaliser]

On 3/24/2019 at 10:12 PM, nobog said:

Well, I've never heard that.  Its a physics thing. At to high a angle the wings loose lift - and you fall out of the sky, that's what the AoA (angle of attack) system tell you.  Pilots take this very seriously.

 

Nobody can doubt the physics, or the importance of knowing about an incipient stall. Many lives have been lost in aircraft (including modern airliners) that were allowed to stall when they needn't have.

 

But that's not what this is about. Would either an AoA indicator or an AoA disagree warning light on the flight deck be useful or effective, whether in this situation or others? Imagine you've got several hundred indicators around you already, including a couple of dozen that are designed to be right in front of your eyes. You've got a stall horn blaring, a stick shaker going like the clappers, the aircraft is pitching up and down, the autothrottle doing goodness only knows what. Will you notice or process the information coming from two additional small indicators? Or will it just add to your information overload?

 

Nevertheless, the PR situation - driven by people (incl journalists) who really don't know anything about flying a modern airliner - has inevitably pushed Boeing into including these for free.

[Globaliser]

On 3/22/2019 at 3:10 PM, em-sk said:

In principle a 2 out of 3 voting system is statistically better than a 1 out of 2 system assuming everything else is equal

 

Until you have a simultaneous fault on 2, which freeze at the same (wrong) setting. Whereupon the voting system rejects the single correct reading. And then people died - fortunately it was not a passenger-carrying flight.

[rkacruiser]

4 hours ago, Globaliser said:

But that's not what this is about. Would either an AoA indicator or an AoA disagree warning light on the flight deck be useful or effective, whether in this situation or others? Imagine you've got several hundred indicators around you already, including a couple of dozen that are designed to be right in front of your eyes. You've got a stall horn blaring, a stick shaker going like the clappers, the aircraft is pitching up and down, the autothrottle doing goodness only knows what. Will you notice or process the information coming from two additional small indicators? Or will it just add to your information overload?

 

I think this is an excellent comment.  From what little I have read, the pilots may have had as little as 40 seconds to determine what the problem was and to "fix" it.

[em-sk]

11 hours ago, Globaliser said:

 

Until you have a simultaneous fault on 2, which freeze at the same (wrong) setting. Whereupon the voting system rejects the single correct reading. And then people died - fortunately it was not a passenger-carrying flight.

 

For the sake of argument, lets assume the probability of one failing is 5%.  The probability of both failing is therefore 5% x 5% or 0.25%.  

[GeezerCouple]

Not sure how accurate this is, but CNN is just reporting that the Ethopian pilots (who are reportedly typically well-trained) DID follow the Boeing procedures.  There are now questions about whether something "else" or "additional" went wrong.

 

We'll take a pass on the 737 MAX for while once it is back in service.

Whether it would have been better, in retrospect (*always* easier "in retrospect", eh?) to start over with a new plane.... rather than sort of jury-rig an existing one the way they did...???

 

Well, we certainly aren't the experts, but we do get to choose which plane we will fly on.

We typically do not fly on a brand new model at first, anyway.

 

GC

[rkacruiser]

6 hours ago, GeezerCouple said:

Whether it would have been better, in retrospect (*always* easier "in retrospect", eh?) to start over with a new plane.... rather than sort of jury-rig an existing one the way they did...???

 

Recent news reports about why Boeing made the decision to not start with a new plane due to being in competition with Airbus concerns me.  The possible "coziness" between the FAA and Boeing concern me. 

 

The final answer for the cause of these two tragedies won't be known  for months.  And, we won't know if a faulty business decision on the part of Boeing contributed to these accidents for probably an even longer period of time.  If ever.

 

As a Boeing shareholder, I look at my Proxy for the Annual Meeting later in April and wonder how should I vote?  Time to make a vote of "no confidence" in the current Management by voting for those issues the Board opposes and voting against the issues the Board supports?