Heiwaco

A comparison using one of the pictures in the link above and a very good picture from its former glory days found in Wikipedia (https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b7/Costa_Concordia_in_Palma,_Majorca,_Spain.JPG) I made this side-by-side comparison.

 

 

The bow thruster symbols visible in the Wikipedia picture are at the deck 0 level and the anchor sits between the deck 1 and 2 level. This means that deck 0 is still flooded or partially flooded (based on chengkp75 observation that the bow is higher than the stern). If they have not yet pumped out the water inside, then decks A and below are still flooded.

Hm, the hull is full of water everywhere below present waterline just above deck #0 and cannot be pumped out for obvious reasons = multiple hull structural leakages due to initial contact port side/bilge aft, capsize (starboard side fwd/aft), sinking and not to forget parbuckling (starboard bilge fwd/aft) and 25 open watertight doors in all bulkheads. The only reason why the wreck is floating is the external sponsons providing buoyancy.

Only way to remove the sponsons is to provide permanent buoyancy inside the damaged, water filled hull. And how to do the latter? Pump out intact hull compartments? Not so easy with the watertight doors open. Intact double bottom tanks? Then you must get the water out and air in through air pipes and ballast pump pipe connections. Etc, etc.

Decks A, B and C are full of rotten crew accommodation fwd of the engine rooms.

Personally I think it is not possible to create the internal buoyancy, so easiest solution is to tow out what remains of the water filled wreck/empty sponsons and sink it all outside Genoa, e.g. adjacent to T/T Haven.

 

 

 

Another big chunk on its way to the recycle bin. This was the part below where the funnel used to be.

It is a piece of deck #6 being lifted off. The thing is still full of water and cannot float without sponsons and cannot be brought to drydock, etc, etc. http://heiwaco.com/news811.htm

So let me see, here is the quote from SOLAS taken from your website:

 

'the number of openings in watertight bulkheads shall be reduced to a minimum depending on the design of the ship ...; satisfactory means to close the openings shall be provided' (SOLAS II-1.15.1).

 

So, SOLAS does allow watertight doors, and it therefore falls on the IMO (who oversees SOLAS) and the class societies to determine what the "minimum" number is. And then you clearly state that the IMO has made allowances where doors may be left open. Since the IMO is the governing body of SOLAS, where does this become "illegal"? Your whole argument is false. It may be imprudent in your opinion, but not illegal.

SOLAS allows one watertight door between engine rooms, where one watch keeper may need the door, etc. all subject to HAZOP, risk analysis, requirements that the door is closed at sea, and so on.

SOLAS does not allow 25 watertight doors for an underpaid crew to stroll through at leisure. And not several doors in one bulkhead.

And there must be two means of escape from manned hull compartments, none of which is a watertight door. CC didn't have it. So crew escaped and left the illegal doors open, progressive flooding took place, stability was lost, ship capsized, sank and people drowned.

And it was decided to blame it on the Master.

 

1. It seems the turn was not executed as expected. We don't know why? The Master ordered the helmsman to turn the rudders but we don't know what he did. The Voyage Data Recorder was switched off. All very strange.

 

What's very strange is that the Italian Ministry of Transport report has data from the VDR and recordings from the voice recorder. Why don't you?

 

2. After reviews of the situation - ship was stable, etc. - the various alarms were raised but passengers had no idea how to muster.

 

Who says the ship was stable? Certainly not the Chief Engineer, who was there.

 

3. The passengers shall muster at their muster stations and be counted, etc, and then be escorted by the responsible crew members to the life boat and counted again. Then the lifeboat is launched and the crew members report this to the Master. It was not done. There was no system to abandon ship.

 

That's the problem. Until the "general alarm" is sounded, which was 50 minutes after the collision, the passengers do not go to their muster station, nor do crew go to their emergency stations. You obviously have never been on a ship.

 

4. I say so and SOLAS says so. Yes, plenty ships are operating illegaly. And nothing is done about it. I wonder why.

 

What section of SOLAS proscribes them? Very interested to see this section.

 

5. Just study the fine print of any marine insurance contract.

 

I guess this goes to your contention that the ship was "unseaworthy", what specifics do you have?

 

6. I have reviewed the three reports at my web site. The English of one of the reports is so bad you wonder who wrote it. None is acceptable.

 

So, to prove your argument, you refer back to your argument on your website. Can anyone say, "circular reasoning"? I'm asking for independent confirmation of your allegations.

 

Anyway, the Master has appealed his sentence but we do not know the reasons. Media do not report them. Media do not know anything about safety at sea.

 

What gets me, is that you make no mention of the fact that Schettino continued to call for helm orders when the ship had no power whatsoever, given that the main generators were offline, and the emergency generator tripped after 41 seconds. What idiot who has been to see for more than a year doesn't know you need power to turn the rudder. This isn't a sailboat with a tiller.

 

I'm done. Go visit your friend Schettino in jail, he needs a few friends.

1. There are no Voyage Data Recordings available. Voice data is apparently available but they do not record if the rudders moved, etc.

2. Well, the ship was floating, upright and all aboard were alive. It seems the ship was stable.

3. I have been on ships since 1955 and know what happens there.

4. I explain the situation at http://heiwaco.com/news86.htm . Don't you know that the scandal has been discussed at the IMO since ... 1994?

5. According to basic insurance rules the ship must be seaworthy for insurances to be valid.

6. Study http://heiwaco.com/news810.htm ... and we can discuss.

Schettino is not in jail and has appealed his sentence. He is not guilty of anything until any judegment is final.

But it is not really my biz ... innocent people in jail. No, my biz is safety at sea so that accidents at sea can be avoided. Don't you like it?

Oh, heck, I'll ask the obvious.

 

1. Regardless of whether or not it was "company policy" to pass close ashore, or whether or not the navigating officer plotted the course, it was still the Master's responsibility to ensure the maneuver was safe, and he even took the conn, giving him even more responsibility.

 

2. Schettino did not sound the "general alarm" until 50 minutes after the ship struck the rock. It is not until the general alarm sounds that crew assigned to lower the boats go to their stations, and lower the boats. If Schettino was worried, why not make an announcement to have the boat crews report early? Two minutes after sounding the general alarm, Schettino makes the decision to abandon ship, and announces to the passengers to go to their muster stations. They should have been there for the last hour. Within 15 minutes of Schettino's decision to abandon ship, and 15 minutes after the boat crews were ordered to the boats, Schettino ordered 4 boats launched (only 4), and within 5 minutes after that, boats were launching. And Schettino was unable to announce the abandon ship himself, the Staff Captain had to do it.

 

3. Anyone who knows ships knows that the passengers are to evacuate first, taking to the boats, and then the crew moves from their emergency stations to their raft stations and loading and launching rafts commences.

 

4. Who says the W/T doors are "illegal"? If that is the case, then there are a lot of ships out there operating "illegally", and every maritime agency in the world is working in complicity to ignore this. Can you link an IMO or even a class requirement that makes these doors illegal?

 

5. Please provide a link that shows the vessel's insurance was "not valid", or any regulatory body that has stated the Concordia was "not seaworthy".

 

6. And finally, please supply the source of your allegation that "none of the official reports meets IMO requirements".

 

Until I see links to this data, I'm done with you.

1. It seems the turn was not executed as expected. We don't know why? The Master ordered the helmsman to turn the rudders but we don't know what he did. The Voyage Data Recorder was switched off. All very strange.

2. After reviews of the situation - ship was stable, etc. - the various alarms were raised but passengers had no idea how to muster.

3. The passengers shall muster at their muster stations and be counted, etc, and then be escorted by the responsible crew members to the life boat and counted again. Then the lifeboat is launched and the crew members report this to the Master. It was not done. There was no system to abandon ship.

4. I say so and SOLAS says so. Yes, plenty ships are operating illegaly. And nothing is done about it. I wonder why.

5. Just study the fine print of any marine insurance contract.

6. I have reviewed the three reports at my web site. The English of one of the reports is so bad you wonder who wrote it. None is acceptable.

Anyway, the Master has appealed his sentence but we do not know the reasons. Media do not report them. Media do not know anything about safety at sea.

God, I hate to feed this troll, but I just can't let this insanity go unanswered.

 

First off, a very, very simple root cause analysis of the Concordia sinking shows that if Schettino had not made the deviation from course, the ship would not have struck the rock and started the whole chain. Therefore, his actions are the root cause of the incident, and therefore, he as a licensed Master is responsible.

 

Get your facts straight. The breach in the hull breached 5 watertight compartments. No ship afloat is designed to be a 5 compartment ship. Cruise ships are generally two compartment ships. The only progressive flooding came when the drag of the 5 flooding compartments took the subdivision bulkhead down enough that a 6th compartment downflooded, not through a W/T door. Schettino's own voice can be heard on the bridge cell phone recording acknowledging that if even 3 compartments were flooding the ship would sink.

 

23 of 26 lifeboats were successfully launched. If 1000+ crew are not sufficient to launch all lifesaving equipment, how many are needed? While few liferafts were launched, they were not needed as the ship was close enough to shore to ferry survivors using the returning boats, and other rescue assets. And the reason the abandonment was so delayed, and so chaotic is that Schettino failed to call for passenger muster and preparing the boats early enough.

 

As to no one else being responsible, both the hotel director and the designated person ashore were convicted of crimes.

 

You must be a close personal friend of Schettino, to still believe his BS. But then, I'm basing my statements on the Italian government's report of the incident, and since it is from a government, by your definition it is a cover-up.

Sorry, you are wrong on all points.

The leg Portovecchio/Savona (two Italian ports) included a planned turn outside Isola del Giglio - all calculated by the 2/O in charge of navigation. It was company policy to show off like that.

Only four compartments were partly breached as the double bottom was intact and the vessel survived the up-flooding of the four compartments. Damage stability calculations confirm this. The Master was happy. It was possible to tow the ship to a port for repairs after the passengers had disembarked.

All lifeboats were not lowered to the embarkation deck, when the General Alarm was raised, to be ready for Abandon Ship. And no life rafts were launched in an orderly fashion. And the mustering of passengers was a fiasco. It seems trained crew were lacking to evacuate the ship.

Schettino's own #1 starboard lifeboat was launched before he could join it. It should have been the last to be launched.

There are three Italian reports about the incidents. None fulfills the IMO standards how to investigate incidents at sea.

Nobody died on the ship on 13 January 2012, when the vessel accidentally contacted a submerged rock. Ship's doctors, nurses and officers will confirm it.

The ship sank and people drowned on 14 January after the ship had capsized due to progressive flooding through illegal watertight doors kept open.

The ship was not seaworthy and unsafe at departure and insurances were not valid. Poor Schettino should have refused to sail and should have stayed in port until all defects were cleared. But safety at sea was of little interest to the shipowner ashore. That's how accidents happen.

Have you got a website about this as well?

Yes, I write about cruise ships and space ships and associated safety matters. Landing a space ship is not possible. Just read the Warning introduction of my web page about the Costa Concordia re-cycling.

The poor Costa Concordia Master didn't kill anybody on the ship or didn't sink the ship himself, when he was fooling around with the Moldovan dancer on the night January 13, 2012.

The ship sank January 14 due to progressive flooding through open, illegal watertight doors and then people still aboard drowned. Abandon ship was not complete as there was not sufficient crew aboard to launch all lifesaving appliances. Cruise ship safety at sea is very poor because the shipowner ashore is not responsible for anything aboard.:eek:

That, and of my all-time favorite quote of his "Humans cannot travel to the Moon". He's worth a million laughs. :D

Please quote me correctly: "No humans have ever been in space"! I laugh all the time at people believing otherwise.

And that a Master of a cruise ship looks after everything incl. cleaning the toilets of all cabins. And that the shipowner is responsible of nothing.

The plan has always been to weld up the breach in the engine room (perhaps filling gaps with epoxies as needed), so "equivalent buoyancy" is not needed.

Please tell me more and I will up-date http://heiwaco.com/news811.htm . :D:rolleyes::eek:

More morbid curiosity here, who is "he who shall not be named"? I can think of a couple.

 

Since he cannot be named here, could you post a link? :D

http://heiwaco.com/news8.htm

The re-cycling of the Costa Concordia wreck/ship is way behind schedule but soon deck #0 will be above water and then the drugs/cocaine apparently loaded there can be recovered.

I describe it at http://heiwaco.com/news811.htm .

The wreck/ship is still of course full of water and only kept afloat by the external sponsons providing the necessary buoyancy.

In order to proceed to the next step - move the wreck/ship into drydock - you must remove all external sponson AND provide equivalent buoyancy inside the hull (without sponsons). It will not be easy.

I have a distinct feeling the project will fail - the wreck/ship breaks into three pieces? - but we will see.

In the meantime Master has appealed the judgement. He doesn't want to go to jail 16 years for a stupid accident. http://heiwaco.com/news8.htm

And, the bad news, monster big cruise ship safety at sea is worse than ever. A single Master cannot be responsible for everything on a cruise vessel with >5000 passengers and >1200 staff/crew, when the shipowner is not really interested in safety. The next incident will be worse.

Better to cruise on small, cosy cruise ships with a friendly crew.

I do not understand http://www.theparbucklingproject.com/

They say that 11 sponsons have been installed on the wreck above water and that 4 remains to be installed (below water) and project is 76% completed. OK, 4 of 15 not fitted ~24% remains.

I think it is 19. Out of 30. So only 37% of the sponsons are attached. Am I wrong? Another 19 shall be attached below water. Easy job.

Or at least the top of the port side blister. :D

 

Anyone know where we are with the amount of remaining grout bags to be positioned?

The side of the capsized wreck's fore and aft ends are resting on two granite reef outreaches, while the part in between is not resting on anything. The forward and aft side sections in contact with the reef are already crushed so that the wreck has displaced down 2-3 meters. The intermediate part at say 0.3L mid ship is not supported by anything

That part may be >100 meters long and the depth between the bilge and the seabed may be 0-6-10 meters. A diver can easily swim below the wreck. And it has to be filled up by grouting bags full of cement in the shape of a wall (an artificial sea bed) with sloping sides, top of which will support the bilge while parbuckling.

With an average width of 10 meters and height 6 meters (the seabed is sloping) and length 100 meters the volume of the grouting wall will be a staggering 6 000 m3 and to build it you need say 20 000 tons of cement or 240 bags each 25 m3. The bag is brought down empty and filled in situ via a long hose from a supply boat with cement above. It seems this work is going on. Supply boats come and go!

When the ship is finally rotated the starboard bilge of the slender ship’s hull will touch the top of this grouting bag wall and apply a big pressure. It may be >600 ton/m² and it will evidently crush the radiused bilge structure (12 mm plate supported at top/btm by the inner bottom and a side girder). The pressure is also applied to the grouting wall that may slide away.

If nothing then supports the crushed bilge – the grouting bag support has shifted - the wreck may sag into the void and break at the supports at the ends.

The wreck was evidently not built to be parbuckled. :rolleyes:

Any shipowner blaming the master for everything going wrong isn't worth much. Costa Concordia was not seaworthy all the time prior the incidents 13 and 14 January 2012, which I explain on my web site since a long time. It is a proven fact that the helmsman provided by the shipowner caused the contact. He didn't speak the working language Italian aboard and didn't understand the English of the master. The evacuation was a fiasco and the liferafts were not used as the crew didn't know how to launch them and the passengers didn't knew they existed. Everybody just ran for the lifeboats. No mustering! They didn't test the system.

And the ship capsized due the illegal watertight doors aboard. Watertight doors are not permitted by SOLAS and Costa Concordia had 25. On top of it they were open at sea. Sorry. Not permitted.

The Costa ISM system was causing the incidents and killing people. The master just followed it and is innocent. To improve safety at sea you really have to improve Costa's ISM system and the people responsible for it. Quite obvious!

I read this last night and decided to hold off on commenting. Was he being sarcastic, serious, or just spewing gibberish. I went back this morning to see if I changed my first thoughts. They remained the same this morning. He may be serious but it comes off as gibberish.

He's a nut! :rolleyes:

 

Clive, remote operated camera is good. :D

Me a nut? Actually I know exactly what I am talking about after 40+ years in shipping, crusing, ferrying, you name it. Safety at sea is my biz.

So thanks for linking to me!