chengkp75

While those white areas will have some of what the PP noted, they don't make up the bulk of those spaces. The area forward of the forwardmost pax cabins are officer cabins (mainly the deck officers), and the first center zone going aft will be mainly AC fan room. The second one aft is likely storage, housekeeping, pantry, etc, as others have said. The third one aft is the engine casing, where the diesel exhausts run up to the funnel, and some fans and things for the engine room. The last center space aft will again be AC fan room.

Actually, Maersk has the Dali under time charter to carry Maersk's cargo. I've worked for Maersk in the past (the Danish company, not the US subsidiary) and found that Maersk Copenhagen is a very well run company.

While the cause of the low fuel pressure has not been published, I don't think this had any relevance to the blackouts the next day. Fuel pressure will have a "warning" alarm at a set pressure, and then a "shutdown" alarm at another pressure. Since neither of these were mentioned in any of the timeline of the day of the accident, I don't see that low fuel pressure was a cause, also, low fuel pressure would not have tripped the transformer breakers. I'll disagree with this, in that a problem with one of four generators, when only two are required to be online when under the pilot's orders, isn't relevant to the pilot, any more than to tell him that there are two generators online, one in standby, and one could be torn apart for overhaul. That overhaul would not cause any question of seaworthiness. There may be a small question about using the #3 generator (the one that shut down on low fuel pressure the day before) as one of the online generators while leaving port, but we are not told which generator was running between the time of the blackouts in port and the time of the blackouts underway. Was #3 running the whole time? That would lead me to believe the problem was fixed, but we don't know this information. I don't know what in his "more careful review" that leads him to question the power management system. Could there be a problem in this? Perhaps, but a cargo ship tends to have a very simple "power management" system, and it doesn't seem like the transformers are part of the power management system, they are merely manual. But, what he found in re-reading the existing report confounds me, in that very little description of the power management system is made, and very little about how it was reacting to the failures was not covered. Just like above regarding the fuel pressure problem, there could be underlying problems that caused the blackouts underway, but I fail to see where any of these are even suggested in the report. And, I'm glad you didn't mention "Sal" who has very little engineering knowledge.

Well, given that Sapphire does not have azipods, the vast majority of the propulsion equipment is inside the hull, making dry docking unnecessary for anything other than a bent propeller. Since they locked the propeller, they didn't want the propulsion motor that was not working to "freewheel" as the attached propeller is spun in the ship's wake. That tells me it was likely a bearing problem either in the motor or in the shafting to the propeller. Could have been another problem with the motor itself, but those are more difficult (time) to repair.

The article notes that the "cash flow" for the American Queen was between $16-18 million. Now, not sure if the source or the reporter are confusing "cash flow" with "profit", but if they really mean the amount of money that comes in as revenue, and then goes out as expenses ("cash flow"), that is only a little above $100 per passenger-day. Real hard to make a profit on that.

The US Maritime Administration, the federal agency tasked with supporting US flag shipping, conducted a study years ago, the showed it cost 3 times as much to operate a US flag ship as a comparable foreign flag ship. In that increased cost, crew cost was nearly 5 times higher (and this is for a cargo ship with a crew of 20, imagine a cruise ship with crews of hundreds or thousands). This is a business model Viking will take some time absorbing and finding ways to operate in. I do expect the Queen to be removed from service, but not scrapped. She is 30 years old, well past the point where maintenance costs have increased exponentially over a ship less than 15 years old, let alone factoring in the inefficiencies of a steam power plant with today's fuel costs and environmental concerns. Operation as a museum, or even a tied to the dock hotel are the most likely scenarios.

From the very beginning, Viking didn't understand the realities of operating in the PVSA trade. They thought they could build a riverboat somewhere other than the US and operate it on the Mississippi, and they thought they could own the boats. When they found that there were no exemptions to the US built and US owned requirements, that set them back a couple of years in rollout. Then, they had to face the increased cost of US building, and paying the US owner, Chouest, to charter the boat. Then there is the US crew issues. First, US cruise crews are nowhere alike with crew that Viking is used to, in terms of guest service culture or in terms of loyalty to the company, resulting in massive turnover. Then there is the pay rates (minimum wage levels, etc) and Social Security taxes, insurance, and the liability for wages for injured or sick crew, that foreign crew don't get. ACL has had years of experience with these issues, and has developed a pool of active and potential crew, and the ways and means to locate, attract, and hire them, and even then they struggle with crewing issues all the time. Then there are the customs issues. Foreign flag ships operating in countries where they are not registered have everything that they import be duty free, from spare parts, labor from overseas technical engineers, to food and liquor. US flag ships operating in the US don't get that duty free treatment, so if they need to import something for the ship's operation, it needs to pay duty on it. Even repairs done to a US flag ship, if done outside the US (like a dry docking in Bahamas to lower cost) becomes dutiable at 50% duty. And, finally taxes. Foreign flag cruise ships, even those home ported and operating out of US ports, are exempt from all corporate taxes on revenues earned by the foreign flag vessel. Not so for a US flag vessel. US flag operations is an entirely different universe than foreign flag passenger ship operations, as NCL found out back in 2004 when they started their US flag operations, and with which they continue to have struggles.

Given Viking's struggles with the US flag market, I think it will be many years before Viking poses a major threat to ACL, with their years of experience in building (at their owned shipyard) and operating US flag vessels.

They usually don't for these scenic "drive by's".

None of the photos or video show an anchor deployed. The aerial footage shows disturbed water around the thrusters and azipods, but no disturbed water ahead of the ship where it would be if an anchor was dropped. The route shown on vessel tracking sites shows the ship was making a loop, so no anchoring there, and if the ship were rotating around as shown in the aerial footage, with an anchor down, she would not rotate in her own length as she is shown doing, but would rotate around the anchor, sending the stern into the shore. Now, maybe the other ship that is accused of going too close did anchor, but no evidence has been shown.

Have those people made these comments before or after reading the NTSB report. I would stake my 46 years as a marine engineer, and my time as an expert witness in marine engineering that given the facts as presented by the NTSB, there was nothing that would have forewarned of another blackout, nor anything from those incidents in port that would have contributed to the accident. As I've said, I may change my mind, if other evidence is presented, but based on what has been published, I stand by this. Would love to know what "additional precautions" they suggest should have been taken. And, while I respect the job the Captain does, and have respected most of the Captains I've worked with, I will say that most of them don't have a real clue what goes on in the engineering spaces, especially when the excrement hits the ventilation device.

No, the Key bridge had dolphins that would not have been adequate for even smaller ships. The bulkheading around the power lines that run adjacent to the bridge are larger than either the "dolphins" or the base of the bridge abutments, and due to their small size and distance from the bridge, a ship could "sneak" in between the dolphin and the abutment, just as the Dali did. Look at the Sunshine Skyway bridge, and compare the abutment bulkheading size and the dolphin size and spacing to what was at the Key bridge. The dolphins at the Key bridge would not stop a ship the size of the Summit Venture that took out the Sunshine Skyway bridge 40 years ago. It was 300 ft shorter (so even easier to slip between the dolphin and abutment, and about 1/4 of the deadweight tonnage. Now, the tonnage increase resulted in more devastation to the bridge than a smaller ship would have likely done, but the abutment "island" should have been larger to place the concrete bulkheading further out to slow/stop the ship earlier, and the dolphin should have been larger for the same reason, and closer to the abutment. The Summit Venture would have just bounced off the Key bridge dolphin and continued on to the bridge.

Give me one industry that will make voluntary changes that cost millions when not required to. And name one company that would spend millions for something that may never be needed, when their competitors won't do this, and make more money in the process. Just the cynic in me.

As was shown in the Suez canal with the Ever Given, even a larger ship moving at a higher speed does not move the earth. With enough distance, and enough solid ground in a dolphin or around the base of the bridge abutment, you will stop the ship. From aerial photos above the Ever Given, it drove less than 10 feet into the actual bank of the canal, due to the depth of the canal decreasing as you go towards the bank, causing more friction and drag from resistance on the canal bottom.

Unfortunately, in the maritime industry, it almost invariably takes a catastrophe to make changes. One reason this is, is that there is no one overriding authority. Each nation is responsible for the ships flying their flag. The USCG, nor the NTSB can say that foreign flag ships entering US ports have to abide by safety regulations more strict than those adopted by the international community by SOLAS. So, change to the ships will require action by the IMO, not just the US.

Just a note, virtually no ship can run their engine at less than 6-8 knots. And, the decision to not require tugs under the bridge is up to two entities: Baltimore Harbormaster and USCG Captain of the Port.

While I have gone into and out of Baltimore hundreds of times, passing under the Key bridge every time, it never occurred to me that the tugs were not required for the bridge. Many places in the world require things like this, even Portland, ME requires it. When the "Million Dollar Bridge" in Portland was hit by a tanker, she had two tugs with her, but they let the tugs go when actually transiting the bridge (never could figure that one out), now they remain tied to the ship while transiting. So, no, not infallible, but certainly something most mariners would think would be normal. Actually, the Dali is a little more complex than most ships, in that it has a high voltage bus, in addition to the low voltage bus. This is to power the bow thruster, which requires enormous amounts of power (compared to anything else on the ship), and is similar to cruise ships, where they generate 10k volts to power the propulsion motors or azipods, the thrusters, and the AC chillers. Everything else is stepped down to 480v for shipboard systems. Most cargo ships generate 480v from the main generators, and that is the power used for the engine room systems, so the failure of the HV/LV transformer would not have happened on most ships (though it would on large container ships, as these are the types of ships that use thrusters). So, there is a case where an extra layer of complexity didn't stop the accident, it actually contributed to it. To show how complex it is for the main engine (the propulsion engine), there needs to be a salt water cooling pump running, and a "low temperature" fresh water cooling pump running (these two need to be running to keep a generator engine running as well), then there will be a "high temperature" fresh water cooling pump, a lubricating oil pump, a fuel supply (low pressure) pump, and a fuel circulating (high pressure) pump, all running off 480v motors. If any of these are not running, you can't restart the main engine. These are the pumps that I mentioned before that are on a timed, phased restart program to prevent overloading the generator, i.e. sea water pump first, then low temp cooling, high temp cooling, lube oil, fuel supply, then fuel circ. Plus, the engineers will have to manually reset several safety interlocks once these pumps are up and running to get the engine to the "ready to start" status, and then a few more seconds to actually start the engine and get it running. Now, as noted in the NTSB report, the steering system did not shut down altogether, one of three pumps (again, more redundancy than most ships which only have 2 steering pumps) is connected to the emergency generator, which will come online automatically when there is a blackout, within 45 seconds. The problem is, that without propulsion, there is little water flow past the rudder and a ship's rudder requires water flow to work (this is why conventional steering loses effectiveness below about 5 knots). So, even if more than one steering pump was attached to the emergency generator, you would still have very little steerage as the ship coasts down from 8 knots. I'm not saying something isn't necessary, I'm asking how many layers of redundancy do you want? Two generators online (even though one can carry the full load) didn't stop the accident, do we run 3 or 4? What about the pollution from idling those two additional engines, or running all 4 at low load, and more fuel burned. Do we have two separate busses so that half of the equipment is running on one bus, and half on the other? How do you power that efficiently, especially once you get to sea? And, even having standby generators, and standby pumps, doesn't mean the engine or pump will start and run immediately or correctly, as anything can fail at any time. So, do we have more redundant pumps (most ships have three of each type mentioned above, so that one is running, one is standby, and one can be down for maintenance or act as second standby)? And, just remember, that each addition to a ship costs money, both to build and to operate, and that would be reflected in the freight cost (cost to ship cargo), which in turn is passed along the line, eventually to the consumer of the cargo, and remember also that 85% of the world's economy has been shipped by sea at some point.

Can you share those thoughts? I'd like to hear them.

As far as safety equipment, yes, I would say that Titanic was transformative, but as far as ship design, not so much. Today's cruise ships are designed as "two compartment" ships, meaning that you can completely flood two adjacent watertight compartments, and the ship will stay afloat. The Titanic was also built to the "two compartment" standard. However, in extreme cases, like Titanic and Concordia, that two compartment safety factor is null and void. The Titanic breached six of her sixteen watertight compartments, all adjacent, and this weight forward caused the ship to tip down by the bow and start overflooding the watertight bulkheads into undamaged compartments. Did this further downflooding contribute to how fast Titanic sank? You bet, but with 6 compartments breached there was no force on God's Earth that was going to keep that ship afloat, just too much weight and too much lost buoyancy. Concordia breached 4 adjacent compartments, and just like Titanic, there was nothing on earth that would keep her afloat, again too much weight and too little buoyancy.

Most likely since this was probably sent from the compliance department, not customer service.

More than risk tolerance, it is risk analysis. I don't know what you know about the use of risk analysis matrices (or probability and consequence matrix), you cross reference a probability of a failure happening, with the consequences if it does happen. In your case, a failure of a ride in Disney would likely have a low probability (design features, redundancy), but a high consequence (death, serious injury). The ship blacking out and striking a bridge would also have a low probability (how many times has it happened in the past), and a likely medium consequence, as the likelihood of a total bridge collapse would be considered (up until now) as not likely, so relatively less threat of loss of life. So, the Disney ride needs to have more remediation features (again, design features and redundancy) due to its high risk/consequence rating, while designing new systems for a ship would likely not be considered necessary, but changes to operating procedures may be needed.

Well, as I've stated, there are still a lot of questions, mainly why the two generator breakers tripped, after the transformer breakers tripped. Was there some other standby/emergency power system that was not working fully/correctly? Don't know. These breakers should not have tripped, given the facts as laid out in the report, but they did. That slowed, somewhat the restoration of power, though the #2 generator had started from standby, and was generating power, and power was restored to all systems within 30 seconds of the second blackout (meaning the standby generator started, came up to speed, and connected to the bus in about 1 minute). However, restarting all the systems needed to get the main propulsion engine running takes about 2 minutes, as these are high starting load pumps, and they are restored automatically in a timed, phased sequence over about 60 seconds. Having been in engine rooms where ships have blacked out or lost propulsion, getting things running in the time the Dali crew had, was damn good, with the alarms going off, and the lights going out.

Exactly, this is the compliance department review of the itinerary.

I'm not saying that nothing can be done just because there are a lot of ships. What I am saying is that of those 118k ships, how many have caused bridges to collapse? What are the odds? Did the safety systems you designed for Disney guarantee 0% failure rate? What I am saying is that blackouts on ships are a known failure, and that there is probably very little that can be done about it on the ships (and the Dali actually exceeds most ships in redundancy, in that it had 4 main generators), so maybe some thought should be made when designing a bridge that it could be hit by a ship.

If you'll note from the NTSB report, the ship's minimum speed of "dead slow ahead" is 8.1 knots when loaded. This means that if you want to go slower, you need to stop the propeller completely, and allow the ship to coast. The next higher speed is "slow ahead", at 10 knots. Not much difference between these two, and probably less than a minute in time difference during the allision. Secondly, ship's rudders lose effectiveness at about 6 knots and below, so if going slower than dead slow, you lose the ability to steer effectively. And, even at 8 knots, could the ship have stopped all way and backed off from the bridge piling? Probably not. To reverse this propeller requires stopping the engine (it is directly attached to the propeller, no gearbox or anything), administering compressed air into the engine cylinders in opposition to the ahead firing order (so the blast of air pushes down on a piston coming up) to stop the engine's rotation, then shift the fuel pumps to the astern firing order, send compressed air again to the engine in the astern direction, to get the engine rolling, and when there is enough heat in the cylinder to ignite the fuel, the engine will start turning the propeller in the astern direction. This, even from dead slow ahead to any astern bell will take a minimum of 45-60 seconds, and then when first turning in the astern direction, you have not built up much force to counteract the inertia of the ship.