Heidi13

You are so correct, as the true facts will only be known once the Dutch Marine Investigation Branch releases an interim report and upon completion of the investigation, the final report. Everything until then is purely speculation, frequently from armchair experts, other than the information released by the Captain onboard the vessel

The following cruise could be expected to be delayed, but since steam is not a critical component on cruise ships, it is highly unlikely the next cruise would be cancelled. Delayed departure will most likely result in waiting for the arrival of the investigating authorities.

Sad news today. Based on my time at sea, I only experienced something similar once and that was on SS Oriana. During topping up the boiler feed water, they over-filled, getting water into the super heated steam lines. We had numerous failures with fortunately no injuries, but the lower 2 decks were filled with steam. It was dense fog below decks until we got it vented. Searching those areas for crew members is something I'll never forget. Sad to read the "Ambulance Chasers" are already making accusations. We will all know the facts once the Dutch Accident Investigation Board complete and release the preliminary and final investigation reports.

It is most unfortunate that others are now experiencing similar issues with the incompetent management running the L/A Office. Hope you do get it resolved. If it was a systems issue, why did the refundable and non-refundable credits work perfectly for us back in 2020. Sadly, it wouldn't be the first time the incompetent L/A managers speak with forked tongue.

In addition to being very walkable, you can also walk across the airport runway, as walkers and vehicles must cross the runway to reach the Spanish border.

Sorry, missed this one yesterday. Affirmative, you will cross the IDL. When crossing the IDL steaming West you skip a day. Steaming East from HK to Vancouver, upon crossing the IDL, the Cloxs are put back 24 hrs, so you will experience the same date again.

When we visited UK every couple of years, we bought kids clothes, shoes, etc. No major purchases, but with VAT at 17.5% and now 20%, we got a reasonable refund every visit. Money is better in my pocket than the Governments.

When discussing cruising and wifi, high speed and reasonable cost are never normally used in the same sentence. If wifi access is key, then you should only be considering ships that have starlink installed. You should also be aware the the Geo-stationary sats, are less reliable in Alaska, due to their low altitude in the sky, while in the Caribbean, where they are at a higher altitude, you have less periods of no service Skagway, at the berths by the mountain is notorious for having no sat service, as the mountain blocks direct line of sight to the sats. Have not researched starlink access in Alaska, but I expect they have less sats visible above the horizon than in the Caribbean. The other consideration, you can pay for fast access, but you are still limited to whatever bandwidth is available from visible sats. You are also sharing the bandwidth with fellow pax, crew and the ship's business, so speed depends on how many are sharing.

I recall the Chief addressed this in an earlier post. It is highly unlikely that sump tanks on the existing tonnage can be redesigned to meet SOLAS and OEM requirements. However, they can mitigate the additional risk by developing revised operational procedures, that are incorporated into the SMS.

Having worked mostly with LR & ABS, I found LR to be a little more diligent than ABS, so I figured it would need a Condition of Class, just wasn't 100% certain.

One of the key changes in the Marine industry has been eliminating the "Blame" culture, especially with the national accident/incident investigation organisations. By eliminating the "Blame" culture, it improves the chance of thoroughly investigating incidents to determine the facts, root cause and the often multitude of contributing factors. When I started sailing as Master back in the 1980's, the saying that you were only as good as you last docking was very relevant. Note - my first command included 16 dockings per day. The blame culture was very much in force those days and it didn't matter how many perfect dockings you made, a single bad one could impact your career. With the elimination of the "Blame" culture, provided you perform in accordance with the company policies and procedures, as outlined in the SMS, your job is generally safe. By reporting incidents and participating in fact finding, we improve the quality of incident investigations, so changes can be made to procedures to reduces the probability of it happening again. With respect to the investigation, it also does not focus on assigning blame. The primary function is to determine the facts and consequently the root cause and contributing factors. Once this is known, commercial litigation may result over the next many years. From a customer perspective, the passenger purchased the cruise from Viking Cruises, who must take all reasonable measures to protect the brand and reputation. I'll suggest Viking were very generous in initially caring for the pax and repatriating them home, then went well above the contractual requirements with the compensation provided. Yes, this was a huge financial cost to Viking Cruises, some of which may have been covered by insurance, but I suspect a significant portion was an operational cost. The report highlights errors by the shipyard, Class Society and the Ship Managers, so Viking may have legal recourse against any/all of those parties to mitigate their financial loses. However, the contacts hiring each party will be scrutinised, as will the oversight of each contractor by Viking Cruises. Another possible curve ball is a shipyard trick to mitigate liability during a design/build contract - once a drawing is complete, it is sent to the owner for review and approval. If the shipyard sent the non-SOLAS compliant tank drawings to Viking, or the Ship Manager and the drawings were signed off as approved, the shipyard may have transferred the liability. If Viking Cruises initiate proceedings against other parties it could potentially drag on for many years, as there are no doubt many legal avenues that I don't know.

The cruise line cannot legally prevent you from disembarking, or "Jumping Ship". However, as others explained, the Coasting Trade Act is Canada's cabotage laws, which prevents foreign flag tonnage transporting pax or cargo from 1 Canadian port to another. If you wish to "Jump Ship" in Victoria, you will be in contravention of the Act. If the cruise line is fined for your actions, they will pass on the costs of the fine and possibly additional administrative costs. The Act does not consider your Nationality, the contravention is due to your passage on foreign flagged tonnage. For contraventions of the Act, the ship can be fined up to $50,000. If you were sea sick and were medically disembarked by the ship's doctor, they may consider extenuating circumstances. However, in 40 yrs at sea, I have never seen a pax or crew member medically disembarked due to sea sickness. Are you willing to receive a $50K + bill to disembark early?

How I read the report is that the Master, on reviewing the weather reports and condition of the vessel, did not consider that delaying departure was necessary. Since SRtP requirements were not known, the decision to sail, is at the Master's discretion. This is based on experience, feedback from Officers and Pilots, any relevant policies in the SMS and any weather forecasts or pertinent reports. The SMS made no reference to SRtP requirements. I'll suggest the Master and Senior Officers did not have a sufficient working knowledge of the SRtP requirements, so this regulatory requirement was not included in the pre-sailing review. This may surprise a number of pax, as many see the Master and Senior Officers as the resident experts that know everything. Unfortunately, with the complexity and ever changing plethora of International, National & Local Acts & Regulations, this is just not possible. To provide an example, I last studied Shipmaster's Business and Ship Construction back in 1984, when I completed my Masters. Sailing as an operational Master, I was updated on any new/updated relevant regulations by the company. In addition, I maintained a membership in the Nautical Institute, a professional organisation that assisted in promulgating changes. I gained my additional regulatory knowledge from some projects I was assigned. Spent a number of years working for the VP Ops, with regulatory liaison being part of my role and then 2-yrs developing a new Level 2 Fleet Operations SMS. When I started the SMS Project in 2010, I recall reading of SOLAS changes regarding SRtP, but since our ships were all existing prior to it coming into force, I didn't need to research the requirements and include SRtP factors in the sailing decision matrix. The sailing matrix was a comprehensive document with 3 levels - Do not sail, Master's discretion to sail and no issue with sailing. Had even a single vessel in the fleet been subject to SRtP I would have had to research the regulation and include every potential scenario, in accordance with the regulations, where the vessel couldn't legally sail. Since SRtP came out about 2010, I am surprised the Ship Managers missed including it in the SMS, which would have been developed for Viking Star, prior to 2014. Each of the operational Masters and Chief Engineers cannot possibly be expected to have a detailed working knowledge of every regulation, which is why it is critical that the SMS is comprehensive and continuously updated, to provide the operating crews the correct information required to make informed decisions. Viking Cruises employ the Ship Manager (Wilhelmsen Ship Management) to provide the Masters and Deck/Engineering Officers, and provide the required technical services to manage the vessel. This includes providing a comprehensive SMS and the ISM required Designated Person Ashore (DPA). The DPA apparently did not have sufficient working knowledge of SRtP Regulations and also was lacking in not identifying the Master's failure to report the loss of a DG to Class, who would then report to Flag. It has been many years since I was involved in these details, but in addition to the reporting requirements of the defective engine, the vessel may possibly have required a Class issued, "Condition of Class" prior to sailing. Hopefully the Chief can confirm @chengkp75 Discounting the failure to comply with SRtP Regulations, the decision to sail is highly subjective, and is based on risk assessment, ship's handling characteristics and the experience of the Master and Senior Officers. I believe the Master was an experienced mariner on the Norwegian Coast and he was supported by 2 coast pilots. In a similar situation, as an operational Master with a similar ship in the local Canadian waters I know well, I would have no hesitation with sailing. I have sailed in similar conditions on the coast many, many times without incident. However, the final decision to sail would be based on any SMS restrictions and conducting a risk mitigations to lower the increased risk. The report confirms that the vessel handled the seas well and the conditions were well within the design parameters. Since the root cause of this incident is faulty tank design and low oil levels, had all 4 engines been running, the ship would most likely still have blacked out. With 4 engines, the additional alarms may have increased the troubleshooting time, delaying the time to get 1 DG re-started and synchronised to the main board. Note - even before I retired, more weight was given to pax comfort, as while the ship can easily handle the seas, many pax could not. I don't see any significance in the Master not having considered the option of remaining in port. As a Master, my job was to complete the scheduled sailings, safely and in accordance with the SMS. When I considered options, they were sailing options - depart as scheduled, delay departure, seek safe refuge in deep water, alternative routing, etc. Only when none of those options were safe, would I default to the stay in port. To summarise, personally, I never considered staying in port as 1 of the potential options options, as it was the default, if no option was deemed acceptable.

I'm just heading out for the day, so will endeavour to remember and contribute my thoughts this evening.

Clay, 1. Affirmative, the TA's refundable credits only showed once we boarded the ship 2. Negative, existing optional shore-ex paid pre-cruise with credits or cash were not refunded, so the TA credits could be used. 3. When shore-ex are cancelled for missed ports, or change of plans, the shore-ex cost was returned as a refundable credit (paid pre-cruise by Visa) or non-refundable credit (paid pre-cruise with credits). New onboard optional shore-ex bookings were always charged to refundable credits, if available.

I have booked the prior cruise on that ship, disembarking in Buenos Aires 28th Jan.

While I haven't read the entire report, I started with the conclusions (Section 3) and have read most of Section 1. In the areas I have read so far, the Master's and the crews actions were minor contributing factors compared to others. Tank design - the shipyard designed tanks not complying with SOLAS and OEM guidelines. They further compounded this by installing an ineffective tank monitoring systems. These are not crew issues. Plan Approval - The Flag State has delegated plan approval to Classification Societies, so Lloyd's Register were responsible for checking the shipyard design plans were in accordance with SOLAS and the Flag State (Norway). They were then responsible to approve the plans and ensuring the vessel was built according to said plans. Again, this was not a crew issue. Remote Lub Oil Monitoring System - with fully integrated alarm and monitoring systems, this is a key component of any modern ship. This system was complex and not installed correctly, resulting in the Engineers receiving inaccurate and unreliable data. In this situation, the crew was not provided the correct tools to effectively manage the machinery. Machinery Alarm Panel - modern ships have literally tens of thousands of sensors hooked up to the alarm panel. Modern diesel generators have automatic shut-downs for critical alarms, that include overspeed and loss of lub oil. On my last ships, these critical alarms were grouped separately, so my Chief Engineer could quickly advise why the engine automatically shut down. In the Viking system, they did not register by priority, so the Engineers had to scroll through 1,000 alarms on the screen. Faced with this type of challenge, I'll suggest the engineers did rather well, reasonably quickly identifying the issue and getting an engine restarted. The time interval was considerable, but with less experienced engineers, it could have been longer. Lub Oil Management - this is a potential crew issue, but one must also take into consideration that no definitive minimum levels were provided by the OEM, upon request by another ship. The OEM declined to provide a definitive answer, as the tanks were designed/built by the shipyard and not to OEM recommendations. While the crew should have erred with higher levels, the Designated Person Ashore, should have taken action to solve the issue with the shipyard and OEM. The ship's SMS should have included clearly defined min and max levels for the engineers to follow. Departure Decision - With 1 DG out of service, resulting in failure to comply with SRtP Regulations, the Master should not have sailed, unless he determined a higher risk to the vessel by staying in port, and sailing in accordance with the responsibility outlined in ISM 5.2. However, the constantly changing plethora of International, National and Local Acts and Regulations in the marine industry, make it impossible for every Master to know everything. Masters are provided detailed operational guidelines by the company in the Safety Management System (SMS). Many of the modern SMS include a sailing matrix outlining when the vessel cannot sail, and when it is Master's discretion. The SMS is developed by the Ship Management company and clearly did not include this key requirement. Since cruise ships have routinely shut down an engine for maintenance during normal operations, for many years, this non-compliance with SRtP Regs should have been provided to the Master. Post Incident - When drifting onto a lee shore, the Master quickly deployed both anchors by walking them down, which would be the preferred method. Mayday was issued in a timely manner and pax were mustered by the GES. When Assembly Station B was compromised they moved pax to an alternative location. The Master has effectively utilised the resources available, tasking 1 pilot to the con and another to communications, freeing the Master to focus on the emergency response. In the engine room, considering the system challenges with the alarm system they identified the issue fairly quickly and responded accordingly. Once started, they faced a challenging situation getting the DG's to synchronise with the main board and operated them on manual control. Manual control is practiced, but not a common procedure, so in a stressful environment, the engineers response was effective. With respect to evacuation, the Master correctly identified the risks of launching the survival craft in those seas and in close proximity of the lee shore. As most mariners are well aware, lifeboats have killed more people than have been saved by them. Therefore, while a traumatic experience, a helo evacuation was an excellent option. Yes, in hindsight, the crew could have prevented the incident, but I would hardly refer to them as incompetent. Many ships operate with less competent crews, which could have resulted in a worse outcome.

Thanks, as I haven't got to Section 2 yet. I'll suggest we should first consider the factual statement and NSIA opinion separately. As I noted, being in non-compliance with SRtP Regulations, in most situations, the vessel should not have sailed, as it wasn't fully seaworthy. However, the Master has accountability and responsibility to manage the vessel in accordance with his/her best judgement and experience, with respect to safety and pollution prevention. With an impending significant storm, as per the forecasts, the Master could determine that remaining in port was not safe and heading out to sea was a safer option. The Master's overriding responsibility is outlined in the ISM Code Section 5.2. In accordance with ISM 5.2, that Master must take any action, in their professional judgement, to ensure the safety of the vessel, even if it contravenes the company SMS and regulations. Note - I don't believe the Master used ISM 5.2 to justify sailing, but nothing in the report, I read so far, addresses this clause. When the NSIA mention unacceptable risk due to forecast weather, they are getting away from facts and into subjective decisions. As with all after the fact inquiries, it is easy for the landlubber "Experts", to provide subjective opinions. When I went to sea, these type of positions were filled by experienced mariners, with many years of command experience. Sadly, these days, many are filled by those that can't handle command at sea. I recall reading in Section 1 that the conditions were well within the design criteria of the ship, which is a factual statement. For the NSIA to later state "Unacceptable Risk" shows a complete lack of knowledge of risk analysis. Yes, sailing with only 3 engines, in any weather, results in a potential for increased risk. When the resultant risk of probability and severity reaches a certain level, you either incorporate risk mitigation strategies, to lower the risk, or don't sail. The risk is only unacceptable, if no risk mitigation strategies are used to lower the risk. Did the NSIA state that no risk assessment was completed with no risk mitigations incorporated into the plan prior to sailing? I also note that most of the world's tonnage sail with only 1 engine, 1 propellor and no bow thrusters. Therefore, if the NSIA determined the vessel shouldn't sail due to the weather and having only 3 engines, then every other vessel should not have been sailing.

Water-tight doors are small openings in the major transverse bulkheads that divide the area of a ship below the uppermost continuous deck into water-tight compartments. Most ships are considered 2 compartment vessels, so will remain afloat if 2 compartments are compromised. When open, the water-tight doors permit the crew to move freely through the lower decks of the vessel. When approaching fog, the W/T doors are closed to complete the integrity of the entire transverse bulkheads. So no, water-tight doors would not have prevented the sinking. The reason Andrea Doria sank is the original collision compromised at least 3 compartments, with ships normally designed to withstand damage to 2 compartments. When the hull is compromised and/or the transverse bulkheads damaged, water-tight doors in the damaged area will not save the vessel. If the collision had been at the bow, the Collision Bulkhead may have assisted in limiting the damage to the fore peak and 1 other compartment. This may have saved the ship, provided the water-tight doors below the uppermost continuous deck were closed.

I have only read a few pages of the report, so these are preliminary observations. This incident meets the classic definition of the "Swiss Cheese Model" where numerous issues all aligned. To avoid the incident, all it would have taken is for 1 of the issues to be stopped. Assuming all Viking lub oil sump tanks are the same, this incident started many years before they even started cutting steel on the ship. The tank design not being in compliance with SOLAS is a serious error by the shipyard, which was compounded by Lloyds Register not identifying the deficiency during the plan approval. The Ship Managers not including a sailing restriction for failure to meet the "Safe Return to Port" regulations, when 1 engine is out of service is another significant failure. Ship Manager's "Designated Person Ashore" not following up with the email from one of the ships to the engine manufacturers, when they responded they couldn't provide a definitive answer, as the shipyard designed/built the sump tanks. This is another significant failure. With the exception of the failure to comply with Safe return to Port Regulations, I don't see a problem with the Master's decision to sail, as the report states multiple times the conditions were well within the ship's design criteria. As with most serious incidents, I expect the Lawyers will have a field day. I suspect the Owner probably provided the shipyard with a design/build, which usually contains boilerplate that it will be in accordance with SOLAS and all relevant International/Flag State Regulations. If the tank design is not in accordance with SOLAS, you have a potential breach of contract. Lloyd's Register were also hired by the Owner/Ship Manager to oversee construction and to approve the plans. They again could be in breach of contract. The Master sailed with 1 DG unavailable, which was in contravention of the Safe Return to Port Regulations, potentially rendering the vessel as not being fully seaworthy. Lawyers could potentially make an argument that it could limit the owners limitation of liability.

Especially when they have an almost endless supply of new ships arriving to fill.

Affirmative, ship movement or maintenance are the primary reasons for closing and draining (partially or completely) pools these days,

That was one of the questions I asked in my communication with Viking Corporate in Basle. Sadly no interest.

Back in my cadet days the Captain issued us a challenge to calculate the angle of heel resulting from all pax being on the outer decks, on 1 side of the ship. Memory is a little hazy, but I believe it was about 4 degrees. However, I have never been required to conduct a stability calculation with all pax on the upper decks and have never seen any of the templates provided to the Master showing this scenario. When considering ship stability, as a rule of thumb, weight added above the ship's centre of gravity (CoG) reduces the Metacentric Height (GM), which in laymen's terms reduces stability. Weight added below the CoG increases the GM. The height of any weights added is measured from the Keel and is known as KG. Assuming a ship of about 2,500 pax and 175 lbs per pax, the total weight of pax is about 200 tons. This is a fairly significant weight to add to the upper decks, but in conducting a stability calculation, this is not a new weight, as all 2,500 pax are already onboard. Therefore, any calculation would need to include moving groups from an original KG to a higher KG, with the resultant reduction in GM being less than if you added 200 new tons. Prior to departing on a voyage, the Master must ensure the vessel has an acceptable GM, which allows for the consumption of bunkers, water, victuals, etc and the movement of pax and crew throughout the vessel. Even on longer ocean passages, most ships have sufficient stability to not require dumping of the pools. Back on the steam ships, I have experienced dumping one, or more pools to maintain acceptable stability, but it was due to being low of bunkers and FW, at the end of a long cruise. On the steam ships, at 25+ kts we burned 450 - 500 tons of oil per day, so it quickly reduced the GM, as bunkers were stowed close to the keel.

Don't see any bowls with clotted cream and jam on the table, and where are the fresh scones, which are my favourite part of Afternoon Tea.