chengkp75

Again, the SMS model is not to ascertain responsibility, but to ensure that all parties make changes that keep the incident from happening again. Even if one party, like Fincantieri, don't make what are considered to be "sufficient" changes, the system has checks and balances (mainly relying on the "third party" Class society) that will hopefully cover those shortcomings. That is why flag states are required to approve an entity (like a Class society) to audit the SMS programs of all shipping companies that have ships under their flag. The Class societies are also audited by other "third party" companies to ensure that the Class society meets ISO standards for management of their business (ensuring that adequate requirements are promulgated to ensure safe ships). Nearly all parties have some responsibility for this incident, each one being one of the "holes" in the Swiss cheese, and whether one hole is "bigger" than the others, is relatively irrelevant, as all it requires is for all the holes to line up, regardless of how big the passage through the holes is.

I will note that without knowing the terms of the management contract between Viking and Wilhelmsen, that the failures of the SMS system fall more heavily on Wilhelmsen than on Viking, but it also means that Viking needs to be more "hands on" with managing the management company (though proper management of the ships is what they are paying Wilhelmsen for in the first place).

I have not worked with the Wartsila automation system that the Sky utilizes, but a note in the conclusion section makes me feel that is is not as robust or effective as some of the systems that I am familiar with. They state that the system only updates a data point when it changes, not on a time basis. Most systems I've used are multiplex data acquisition systems, meaning that every second the system sweeps through all the data points, for display to the humans. The data points are preset, based on importance, to be read every second, two seconds, 5 seconds, or 30 seconds. This is, in my opinion, a much better system, and one that may have alleviated some of the distrust of the oil level monitoring system that the crew had.

This is mentioned by the NSIA as being, of course, one consideration in whether to sail or not, and is of course a valid consideration, but without a counterbalance of the SRtP non-conformity, it gained perhaps more importance than it should have.

Ramrodding a kitchen renovation now, so getting reading done on this is pretty sporadic.

What they are saying is that staying wasn't considered as an option, as there were no rules from Class or the company's SMS that said it should have been considered. In other words, since nothing pointed to any reason to prevent sailing, not sailing wasn't considered. I've started on the analysis section, and again just quick read through, and I again find that the root cause was the failure by both the shipyard and the Class society to ensure proper design of the sump tanks. There were clear requirements from SOLAS, but no clear instruction on how to implement the requirements, so both are at fault, as is the IACS as the overseeing body for Class. Class seems to have embraced the problem, and is working on remedies, though they still seem to want to place responsibility on the shipyard. The shipyard seems to be disavowing any responsibility, shoving it onto Class and the engine builder. Hopefully, Class, acting as the "third party" will step up and make the requirements needed, that the shipyard will then have to follow. The Viking SMS does seem to have some problems, but as the ISM Code says that the SMS should outline virtually every aspect of how a ship is operated, no one can think of every single combination of circumstances. This is why the SMS is designed to be amended and revised every time there is an incident, seeking to prevent the incident from happening again. This is why the SMS philosophy is not to assign "blame" for an incident that happened, as in the absence of blame, investigators can more likely get honest responses from those involved. The goal is not to blame anyone, but to find the true cause of the problem, and make new policies and procedures to prevent the same thing happening again. The fact that the crews of more than one Viking ship voiced concerns about lube oil levels, both to Viking and to MAN, shows that they were concerned, long before the incident happened on the Sky, and were operating the best way they thought, given the circumstances of the systems involved. It appears that corporate Viking (or Wilhelmsen as operators) did not fully support the ships' crews in dealing with a problem, as they should have under the SMS. While another cause of the incident, I would say that this is fairly common in the maritime industry, as not everyone "buys into" the SMS philosophy completely, and sometimes new personnel take time to realise the benefits of SMS.

I haven't read the analysis or conclusion sections of the report, so I can't say what has been recommended and what has been done, but at the very least there is a new SRtP procedure in Viking's SMS that states different weather conditions depending on what engine is out for maintenance/repair. There will also be amendments to Viking's SMS to delineate the proper assumed lube oil consumption rate, the new required minimum lube oil level, based on the new simulations done by NSIA, proper procedures for maintaining lube oil level while in heavy weather, and likely a few other procedural changes to the SMS. There likely isn't anything that can be done to redesign/rebuild the sump tanks, given ship geometry, so there will have to be measures to mitigate any design deficiency.

I also have just done a quick read through of section 1, and agree with Andy on all points. I will stress that from my readings the root cause of the incident was the failure of the shipyard and Lloyd's Register to adequately design the lube oil sump tanks. Mitigating this, somewhat, is the note from the NSIA that there is no industry standard, or class procedure for evaluating whether the tank actually meets the requirements. I've always been a bit critical of cruise ships that have only 4 diesel generators, but I never thought of the possible consequences to the SRtP regulations. As Andy noted, and I have pointed out over the years here when folks complain about a ship not being able to make top speed, having one diesel down for maintenance, repair, or overhaul is quite common. Overhauls in particular, happen every 2.5 years (about, actually 12,000 running hours), and for engines like the Sky has, they can take 4-5 weeks to complete. This is exacerbated by having different sized generators, though this is common to allow maximum fuel efficiency by tailoring the generator capacity to the load required. Ships with 5 or 6 generators, the individual generator is a much smaller percentage of the total load, so loss of one to maintenance, and loss of 2 or 3 in the other engine room (the SRtP scenario), does not present as significant a problem as the Sky had. The fact that Viking has amended the SMS to show a SRtP scenario for two conditions now (one for loss of large engine and one for loss of small engine), will make this an industry standard (through the IACS), and may affect a lot of ships that have only 4 engines. I also agree with Andy's assessment of the crew. From an engineering standpoint, I have seen many, many ships operated with an SMS program that has too little detail, and non-specific procedures (both ship or class specific from the company, or ship specific based on the Chief Engineer's personal standing orders). I have taken over such ships in the past. I am, however, of the philosophy that I cannot write too much, nor get into the details of how a job is to be performed to much, in my standing orders. They tend to be a 2" ring binder of policies and procedures. As Andy said, this is the Swiss cheese model of an accident. Even with the deficient design of the oil sump tanks, if the Chief had been more specific in his orders regarding lube oil consumption monitoring, level monitoring, and alarm/set point changes and monitoring, the incident would not have happened. If, on the other hand, the tanks were designed properly, and the crew did not necessarily meet the proper procedures for maintaining oil level, the incident would also not have happened. Misalign one hole in the Swiss cheese, and the accident never goes all the way through to the dangerous conclusion. I would not have been happy with some of the equipment choices made (sending the oil level inputs out to a stability calculator to determine a volume and then use that volume back in the engine automation system for the alarms), or an alarm system that does not have a priority system (though virtually every system commercially available will output a thousand alarms at the moment of blackout), so either the shipyard or Viking can be held for those decisions.

I believe the thread title was "tongue in cheek", as this thing could no more compete with QM2 than a ferry boat. There isn't enough demand for "crossings" to support more than the QM2 and the industry knows it.

The "reverse bow" that you see on newer, large cruise ships are designed to give more "hull speed" (the highest speed that can be made with economical horsepower) by lengthening the waterline length (hull speed is proportional to waterline length), and to reduce pitching in seas. The reverse bow is designed more to "cut through" a wave rather than "ride up and down" a wave that a traditional bow does (due to the "flare" or widening of the bow higher up, which adds buoyancy as the bow starts to dig into the wave). For coastal voyages with no real speed requirements (close ports and short passages between means there is no real need for high speed), the traditional bow is probably the better choice. I don't read reviews, but I find this interesting. One main reason to go with a catamaran hull is the fact that with the wider beam, the rolling is less. Now, sometimes a wider ship will be shorter in length (haven't really looked at these ship's specs), and this can lead to more pitching than a longer, narrower single hull. Okay, looked at these, and they are not true catamarans, just a "catamaran bow". The bow is for "near shore" operation, and could be more susceptible to "slamming" in seas in open water.

While it may be "normal practice" to have the passenger present, the ticket contract gives the cruise line the right to search the cabin, baggage, or belongings at any time, with or without your permission or presence.

Truth be told about these "Cruise On" multi-outlets. A few years ago, when they first started marketing these as "cruise compliant", I was asked by a CC poster to look into them, and I found that alongside the advertising text saying "no surge protector" was a photo of the back of the unit that showed a VPN rating (Voltage Protection Number is the voltage where a surge protector "switches on" and sends the high voltage to ground), meaning the unit did have surge protection. I investigated further, and found that "Cruise On" does not make these, but another company makes them and sells them as surge protected. When contacted, "Cruise On" stated that the photo was a "marketing error", and that the units were indeed non-surge protected. Now, the only way to know is to dissect the unit, destroying it. I believe the unit no longer has a VPN on the back, so newer ones may not be surge protected. It leaves me with a bad taste in my mouth, and a bit of professional skepticism about this company going forward.

There is no legality about it. Just as there is no illegality about surge protectors. It is the cruise line's rules, and it is up to the cruise line to determine whether they allow anything onboard.

While the Captain has the "overriding authority" to make these decisions at the time, if it is found that they disregarded an imminent danger to people who turn out not to be terrorists, he and the cruise line could be sued under the "Death on High Seas Act", among other maritime laws.

Correct me if I'm wrong, ace, but do you see underwater when you look out the windows in the Golden Lion? No? Then how does an area about 15-20 feet above the ship flood? Sure it can. Just because it is stopped, doesn't mean the Captain has turned off the ignition switch. The azipods are on line, the thrusters will be on line, and the azipods can create even more wake to propel a boat away than the thrusters. As soon as the boat starts to move, keep the ship dancing away. But, again, 500 lbs of "explosives" depends a whole lot on what type of explosive it is, and how it is packaged, and how it is presented to the target. And, you would be wrong here again. A lot of "pirate" or "terrorist" boats around the world are capable of doing 25 knots or better. Sure, attacking a moving ship is harder, but it has been done, and can be done. And, the use of an LRAD at 20 meters can drop a person to their knees, vomiting and incoherent.

And the standard for convoys during that war was for merchant ships to never stop to seek out survivors from sunk ships, leaving that to escorts. It's called triage, never an easy thing, but something first responders and medical professionals are trained in. Or, as Spock would say, "the needs of the many outweighs the needs of the few".

Which just goes to show how uninformed about maritime issues you are. Naval vessels today do not have armor plated hulls. They are mild steel hulls, just like cruise ships and other merchant ships. Oh, you mean the boat that looks damaged or sinking that can suddenly accelerate to 60 miles per hour and strike the ship? How do you disguise a cigarette racing boat as a sinking wreck? Do you know how bow thrusters work? They push enough water away from the ship to move the thousands of tons of ship away from a dock. If directed at a small boat, it typically will swamp or sink that boat. And, besides, just exploding something alongside a ship does not guarantee that you would seriously damage the ship, let alone blow a hole in her. That requires either a vast amount of explosive, or a shaped charge pressed against the hull, or some form of damping to direct the explosive force towards the ship, and not in all directions. And, even if the ship is stopped, the Captain will have the ability to steer and use thrusters, to keep the damaged boat away from his ship. Or do you think the Captain is so incompetent or uncaring that he would just let the boat drift closer and closer, without taking the basic precautions that sent the rescue boat out to the refugees in the first place? Always amusing, and always uninformed, as usual, ace.

Actually, it is not. The requirement is for all ships to provide aid to persons in distress, provided the Captain does not place his ship, crew, passengers, cargo, or the environment in undue danger. This is why typically, the USCG will, when a ship reports a floating wreck with a bunch of Cuban refugees onboard, if the craft is in no danger of sinking, the USCG will instruct the vessel to merely stay on location with the "boat" until a cutter can arrive. It is the ship's Captain's decision whether to take the people onboard his ship or not.

And ace, shaking my head that you've resurrected this fear of using rescue as a terrorist tactic. In case you haven't noticed, ships have evolved quite a bit since the heyday of fire ships. And, before you bring up possible explosives, remember the USS Cole, which was damaged similarly as you think, and which had a huge hole blown in the side, but guess what, it never sank. Besides, the ship never lets the refugee boat or liferaft, or whatever, alongside the ship. The ship sends the rescue boat, or a lifeboat, to the persons needing assistance, and then transfer them from their craft to the rescue/lifeboat one at a time, not allowing anything to be carried over.

USCG has armed "Sea Marshals" that randomly board ships inbound and outbound from US ports, the cruise ships getting more attention than others. This has been going on since 9/11, but is still in practice. The response may be armed RHIB boats as shown in photos above, or it may be armed service members onboard the ship. Typically, they will have a couple of personnel on the bridge, a couple in the steering gear room (or azipod space (not in the pod)), and a couple in the Engine Control Room. Sometimes armed with just sidearms, sometimes with long guns. Interesting anecdote, when in Hawaii, our Security Officer turned away an armed (long gun), in uniform, USCG seaman from boarding the Pride of Aloha because he had left his ID back at base. He argued about it, but his superior agreed with Security and sent the man back down into the boat. He mentioned to Security that it wasn't planned that way, but if Security had let the man onboard, he would have cited the ship for an ISPS (International Ship and Port Security) Code violation.

No, its not a fee. Foreign flag ships must have a foreign port call. US flag ships can cruise to US ports without a foreign port call. What the savings for the foreign ships is; US taxes (they pay none), labor costs (they pay well below US minimum wage, with no social security payroll tax), inspection fees (they don't have to pay for USCG inspections, nor have as many, or any, compared to US flag ships), insurance (most foreign seafarers have minimal insurance coverage (and none while off the ship), as opposed to US seafarers, customs duty (all ship's supplies brought into the US from overseas that end up on the ship are brought in with no customs duty, since it is merely in transit from a foreign country to a foreign ship, while US ships have to pay duty for the same parts and supplies if they are manufactured overseas). However, smaller cruise ships will charge a higher fare, even if foreign flag, because they can not generate the "economies of scale" that large ships get. As a very small example, a cruise ship that carries 3000 passengers only has one Captain, drawing $150k/year. But, 5 ships carrying 600 pax, need 5 Captains drawing $150k/year. And, that Captain's salary on the larger ship is spread over 3000 passengers, while the smaller ship Captain's salary, while the same amount, is spread out over only 600 passengers.

Probably the larger reason you get the respiratory infection (since the HVAC units have filters already), is that the dry air conditioned air dries out your nasal mucus membranes, and these are the first and best line of defence against respiratory infections. Try using a saline nasal spray daily.

Just so you know, there is no such thing as "cruise compliant". No cruise line certifies anything as being "compliant" with either the law or their rules.

Not sure I follow all the gobbledygook that the OP is saying, but will try to explain how things happen. First, duty free can be open as soon as the vessel is outside the harbor limits, since the ship itself is foreign territory. And, duty free just means that no duty was paid to import the goods into the US, by the seller, so they can pass the savings on to the customer. The customer still has to pay any duty required when bringing the goods back into the US (or other country). The casino will open when 12 miles offshore. The state of Florida has a 6% sales tax, while Miami-Dade county assesses an additional 1%. This is levied on each purchase, based on the "list" price of the purchase (in your case, each drink). This tax is levied anytime the ship is within 3 nm of land in Florida. Typically, the bridge notifies the purser's office whenever the ship crosses the 3 mile or 12 mile limit, and the POS registers are reprogrammed to start or stop charging tax. I don't believe you were being charged a flat tax of $2/drink, I believe you misunderstood that even with a "free drink package", you still need to pay the 20% gratuity charge per day.

I suspect that one diesel engine was down, and it just required an amount of time to repair. Sometimes repairs take more than a day to complete, and crews are no longer allowed to work round the clock, unless the safety of the ship is involved.