Viking Sky position, adrift off Norway Coast and evacuating Passengers & Crew

[zitsky]

7 minutes ago, SLSD said:

OK.  I get the jokes.  But seriously.  I've never cruised on Viking as we really love Seabourn.  My point is that reports like this one give me a bit of pause.  That's all.  

 

Can we make a list of cruise lines that have never had an accident? 

[SLSD]

I'm just saying it gives me pause.  Maybe I am incorrect in feeling this way.  But--I have never cruised on Viking.  I don't have loyalty built up.  I haven't experienced how wonderful it is as a cruise line.  That is all I am saying.  Most cruise lines HAVE had accounts.  I get your point.  

[Heidi13]

3 hours ago, SLSD said:

Quite surprising that Viking was not following manufacturers recommendation.  It makes me wonder what else this cruise line is not doing.  

Before being critical of any group involved in this incident, I suggest you need to understand the relationship between ship owner and ship manager. This is also only an interim report, which provides only a couple of facts and minimal supporting rationales and documentation.

 

Personally, I have no experience on the actual Main Engine Lub Oil levels in each of the 4 engines, as the C/Eng monitored compliance with manufacturer recommendations and the Company's Safety Management System. Hoping the Chief will chip in my his opinion and experience.

 

The interim report clearly states that Wilhelmsen Ship Management are responsible for the technical areas of the ship - Deck & Engineering Dept. In Section 3.1, they state the Investigating authorities are closely working with a number of organisations and list the Manager before the Owner for good reason. The Technical crew are hired and employed by Wilhelmsen Ship Management, who will also provide the detailed Ship Specific Operational Manuals. Compliance is primarily monitored by the Ship Manager, not the Ship Owner. 

 

The interim report also stated that post incident, the Ship Safety Bulletins were issued by Wilhelmsen Ship Management and not Viking.

 

Therefore, if you wish to be critical of Viking, at least find something where they have control on a day to day basis and where they write and control the operational procedures.

[Heidi13]

3 hours ago, SLSD said:

OK.  I get the jokes.  But seriously.  I've never cruised on Viking as we really love Seabourn.  My point is that reports like this one give me a bit of pause.  That's all.  

I suggest it goes both ways, as I note Seabourn is owned by Carnival Corp. One of the largest cruise line polluters, who also lost a ship in 2012.

 

Personally, we haven't sailed on Seabourn and due to the owner never will. Although I have extensive marine experience and follow the industry closely, without personal experience of their operation, I certainly wouldn't be critical of them.

 

If you wish to be critical of Viking, I suggest you should at least have experience with their product and also have an understanding of the information provided in the Interim Report.

[broberts]

No need to get so protective. Blindly rushing into rah rah mode is not productive. 

 

Not being within manufacturer oil level specifications on all engines should make anyone wonder. Suggesting otherwise is nonsensical.

[Pratique]

The technical explanation of responsibility is very interesting but at the end of the day Viking’s name is on the ship and they are the public facing entity. Receiving criticism is part of the cost of doing business. When some company has a data breach I don’t blame the subcontractor I criticize  the business with whom I have a direct relationship. That’s just the way it goes I suppose. I wasn’t there but just reading this report gives me pause, if nothing more.

[philw1776]

What this engineer gets out of the report is that the engine manufacturer has diagnosed the root cause of the problems and issued an easily implemented corrective action.  Wish all serious safety issues were this readily and clearly addressed.
What's still open is the decisions to sail and where. And actions that the ship's Captain did and did not do in response to the emergency.  I'm not competent to even conjecture on this as I don't know the maritime protocols between pilots and ships' captains.  Others here do.  I'll wait for them to explain forthcoming reports covering such issues.

[Pratique]

29 minutes ago, philw1776 said:

What this engineer gets out of the report is that the engine manufacturer has diagnosed the root cause of the problems and issued an easily implemented corrective action.  Wish all serious safety issues were this readily and clearly addressed.
What's still open is the decisions to sail and where. And actions that the ship's Captain did and did not do in response to the emergency.  I'm not competent to even conjecture on this as I don't know the maritime protocols between pilots and ships' captains.  Others here do.  I'll wait for them to explain forthcoming reports covering such issues.

I agree and will also say that I'm not competent to conjecture. However, there are two notable items in this report that got my attention under the presumption that everything in this report is there for a reason.

 

One is that the captain decided to cancel the visit to Bodø and head directly for Stavanger because he was concerned that the weather would prevent them from leaving the quay. The implication from this is that staying on schedule was on his mind and that the weather was a significant factor in making this decision.

 

The other is that the report specifically notes that Hustadvika is a notoriously dangerous area regardless of the weather.

 

The final report may or may not address these items in further detail.

[Heidi13]

19 minutes ago, philw1776 said:

What this engineer gets out of the report is that the engine manufacturer has diagnosed the root cause of the problems and issued an easily implemented corrective action.  Wish all serious safety issues were this readily and clearly addressed.
What's still open is the decisions to sail and where. And actions that the ship's Captain did and did not do in response to the emergency.  I'm not competent to even conjecture on this as I don't know the maritime protocols between pilots and ships' captains.  Others here do.  I'll wait for them to explain forthcoming reports covering such issues.

The Master/Pilot relationship is best described by our log book entry when manoeuvering - courses & speeds to Master's Orders & Pilot's Advice. The report also mentioned the Master/Pilot briefing when they discuss and agreed the voyage plan. In times of disagreement, the Master can over-rule the Pilot.

 

Assuming the Norwegian Accident Investigations are similar to TSB (Canada) & MAIB (UK) the final report will be considerably more detailed in reviewing the voyage plan, human factors, operational procedures, etc. I expect the final report to have a sub-sections on the weather forecasts and the Master/Pilot meeting, with some reports also including transcripts of the Bridge VDR audio. It will also include a number of recommendations.

 

The initial report is often as you indicated - identifying root/contributing causes & actions taken by the Owner, or in this case the Ship Manager to prevent a re-occurrence. 

 

[Heidi13]

11 hours ago, broberts said:

No need to get so protective. Blindly rushing into rah rah mode is not productive. 

 

Not being within manufacturer oil level specifications on all engines should make anyone wonder. Suggesting otherwise is nonsensical.

At no time was I accepting of the low levels. However, as I have no knowledge of OEM recommendations and the day to day management of levels, I mentioned that I hope our resident Engineering expert provides his opinion.

 

I also note that Marine Investigation Organisations are separate from Regulatory, as their prime focus is fact finding and recommendations. They do not assess blame.

 

If anyone wishes to assess blame, based on an Interim Report, my response was simply trying to educate regarding the Ship Owner/Ship Manager relationship. Yes, Viking is prominently displayed on the ship, but based on the Interim Report, the causes for this incident point in the direction of the Ship Manager, who provides the technical management. This service is clearly outlined on their website, which I reviewed to determine the relationship.

[RJ2002]

The buck stops with Viking.

[Spring Ford]

Here is my attempt to identify some key points from the Interim Report. I am not an expert in the field and this is my best effort to extract and summarise information from the report. The report is quite short and I recommend that you should read it for yourself.

 

This is pretty shocking.

 

As usual in such incidents there were multiple "holes in the Swiss cheese"[A] that lined up to permit the path towards disaster to proceed. Eventually a solid bit of cheese was encountered and the disaster was averted.

 

1. "The lubricating oil sump tanks of all the diesel generators (DG) were maintained at 28%–40% capacity. MAN’s recommendation was to maintain them at 68%–75% capacity."

 

2. "Between 0500 and 0904, 18 lubricating oil low level and low volume alarms were registered by the operational DGs. Each alarm, having been accepted, cleared within a few seconds."

 

3. At about 14:00 the DGs stopped automatically due to low lubricant level. I will call this time T.

 

4. The vessel passed within a ship's length of shallow rocks that would have sunk it.

 

5. By about T+ 30 minutes the engineering crew had topped up the oil tanks and brought one of the Engines on line and a few minutes later enabled slow ahead power. The vessel was then manouvered away from immediate danger. It was only a few minutes from going aground.

 

6. At about T+ 65 minutes a helicopter arrived and started an evacuation.

 

7. Vessel manouvered slowly to facilitate evacuation for 18 hours evacuating about 1/3 of the persons on board.

 

8. Vessel then proceeded to a safe port.

There are some interesting questions that occur to me.

1. why was the vessel operated with a low oil level?

2. Why did the 18 low oil level alarms over a period of 4 hours not result in the oil being topped up before the engines stopped?

3. Why was the helicopter evacuation continued for 18 hours when it seems according to the report that the vessel was able to manoeuvre and head towards port?

 

Finally it would seem that the engineering crew worked swiftly to get the ship back on line and averted disaster. This was an unbelievably close call.

 

[A] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_cheese_model
 

[OnTheJourney]

Lots of interesting discussion generated from this interim report. Based on Heidi's indication of how thorough the final report is likely to be, I'll be anxious to read it, as will many here. I will say this...having lived through the experience... I felt the passengers were rather ill-informed along the way as to the weather we were going to be encountering, what might be done in the way of changing the itinerary or any possible plans to maybe avoid the brunt of the storm, and so forth.

 

Having just completed another cruise (different line) that encountered 2 storm systems and had to alter the itinerary, there were numerous announcements and also 2 presentations by the captain in the ship's theatre that included detailed charts, graphs, etc. on the movie screen. A very thorough explanation was provided about why we changed course and what would have ensued had we not.  Then followed a 90-minute question / answer session. It made me think that this level of communication certainly appeared to be lacking on the Sky. Unless I missed some announcements, which I doubt, we knew little about what was going on until the Mayday and general alarm were sounded. While in the ship theatre right before the Mayday, "code echo" was announced, but at the time we had no idea what that meant. 

Edited November 15, 2019 by OnTheJourney

[just_dont]

 

 

 

I mentioned that I hope our resident Engineering expert provides his opinion.

 

 

Yes. As I read the report, I wax recalling @chengkp75 and his wonderfully detailed perspective from this past Spring.

I, too, am eager to hear his learned assessment of this interim report.

 

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[Heidi13]

9 hours ago, Spring Ford said:

Here is my attempt to identify some key points from the Interim Report. I am not an expert in the field and this is my best effort to extract and summarise information from the report. The report is quite short and I recommend that you should read it for yourself.

 

This is pretty shocking.

 

As usual in such incidents there were multiple "holes in the Swiss cheese"[A] that lined up to permit the path towards disaster to proceed. Eventually a solid bit of cheese was encountered and the disaster was averted.

 

1. "The lubricating oil sump tanks of all the diesel generators (DG) were maintained at 28%–40% capacity. MAN’s recommendation was to maintain them at 68%–75% capacity."

 

2. "Between 0500 and 0904, 18 lubricating oil low level and low volume alarms were registered by the operational DGs. Each alarm, having been accepted, cleared within a few seconds."

 

3. At about 14:00 the DGs stopped automatically due to low lubricant level. I will call this time T.

 

4. The vessel passed within a ship's length of shallow rocks that would have sunk it.

 

5. By about T+ 30 minutes the engineering crew had topped up the oil tanks and brought one of the Engines on line and a few minutes later enabled slow ahead power. The vessel was then manouvered away from immediate danger. It was only a few minutes from going aground.

 

6. At about T+ 65 minutes a helicopter arrived and started an evacuation.

 

7. Vessel manouvered slowly to facilitate evacuation for 18 hours evacuating about 1/3 of the persons on board.

 

8. Vessel then proceeded to a safe port.

There are some interesting questions that occur to me.

1. why was the vessel operated with a low oil level?

2. Why did the 18 low oil level alarms over a period of 4 hours not result in the oil being topped up before the engines stopped?

3. Why was the helicopter evacuation continued for 18 hours when it seems according to the report that the vessel was able to manoeuvre and head towards port?

 

Finally it would seem that the engineering crew worked swiftly to get the ship back on line and averted disaster. This was an unbelievably close call.

 

[A] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_cheese_model
 

With respect to the questions raised:

1 - The Interim Report only provided the 2 facts, which were the actual levels & the OEM recommendations. It does not provide any supporting documentation with respect to on-board documentation from OEM, ship procedures, etc. I would expect more details in the final report.

 

2. The Initial Report indicated 18 low oil level alarms over 4 hrs to 09:04. It stated the alarms were accepted, which is a mouse click that silences an audible alarm, but does not delete the alarm or fix the condition. The report then states the alarms cleared within a few seconds, which means the sensor no longer detected a low level. This could tend to indicate a sensor or system issue; however, it was happening on all 3 DG's, which should raise a flag.

 

Another key question in this area is what was done, if anything to stop the alarms from 09:04 to 13:37, at which time it was not low level but low pressure, which is a critical alarm. Haven't sailed with newer MAN engines, but my last ship's 20 yr old MAN's had 3 critical alarms resulting in auto shut-down - low lub pressure, over-speed & oil mist in crankcase.

 

3. The helo evacuation will have continued based on a risk assessment conducted by the Master and Rescue Coordination Centre. Note that although DG's were operational the load sharing was a manual operation and the vessel still did not have full manoeuverability. At approx 09:15, the Master determined the risk of evacuating by helo was higher than that of remaining on board, so evacuation was stopped.

[Pratique]

In other words, the low oil pressure condition didn't exactly sneak up on them. There was advance warning that the pitching and rolling was affecting the oil levels in the sumps.

 

An intermittent alarm could be a sensor or wiring fault but if consistent with all three DGs, combined with the ship motion, it seems like the symptoms would have pointed to low oil levels in the sumps. I've seen this happen with a land-based vehicle having hydraulic systems. Going around corners at high speed, the oil sloshes around and intermittently trips the low level alarm. Solution: top off the tank.

Edited November 15, 2019 by Pratique

[Heidi13]

The final report should outline how/why the sump tanks were at that level and what actions were taken from 09:04 until 13:37 when no alarms are reported. I note the 18 low level alarms are reported to be over 4 hrs before the critical low pressure alarms resulting in shut down.

 

Comparisons between marine diesels and vehicles is akin to apples to oranges, as they have different oil storage. Marine diesels have no sump. Each engine will be a closed system, with the oil stored in a tank below the engine. These tanks will have deep frames and other longitudinal/transverse structure, which restricts the movement of the contents as the ship rolls and pitches. 

[Pratique]

12 minutes ago, Heidi13 said:

Comparisons between marine diesels and vehicles is akin to apples to oranges, as they have different oil storage. Marine diesels have no sump. Each engine will be a closed system, with the oil stored in a tank below the engine. These tanks will have deep frames and other longitudinal/transverse structure, which restricts the movement of the contents as the ship rolls and pitches. 

I was comparing to a specialty vehicle that I worked on, not a conventional vehicle. It had a unique storage system not unlike a marine design.

 

Also the 18 alarms occurred over a four hour period between 0500 and 0904. That seems significant.

Edited November 15, 2019 by Pratique

[OnTheJourney]

In the report, it indicates that at 14:06 and 14:20 the anchors were put out; however, it also says that (apparently) neither anchor held and the ship continued to drift, and then at some point after 14:29 it states the ship was maneuvered towards open waters "still with both anchors lowered". So is this to indicate that the anchors never did actually hold as intended? We were in the theatre at the time and could hear what sounded like more than one attempt with the anchors. It is indeed scary looking at the map, especially our position at the 14:36 mark where we were in "shallow contour" of 5m depth. I think it's safe to say this event would have gone really bad without regaining some engine power. Whatever happened with the anchors? I had heard somewhere along the way that they had to cut the one line and never retrieved an anchor? 

Edited November 15, 2019 by OnTheJourney

[just_dont]

In the report, it indicates that at 14:06 and 14:20 the anchors were put out; however, it also says that (apparently) neither anchor held and the ship continued to drift, and then at some point after 14:29 it states the ship was maneuvered towards open waters "still with both anchors lowered". So is this to indicate that the anchors never did actually hold as intended? We were in the theatre at the time and could hear what sounded like more than one attempt with the anchors. 

There were also no statements about raising the anchors; yet we know that one anchor was at some point released, needing replacement the following week.

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[OnTheJourney]

OK....I knew there was some issue with one of the anchors. Now that you mention it, I recall reading something about that it needed to be replaced. It's just 'chilling', to say the least, reading this report - brings it all back again. We were all extremely fortunate to get out of this thing alive, IMHO. 

[just_dont]

While I was not on the cruise, I closely followed the situation, nearly from the beginning, through most of the night, and watched live video from the port in Molde as the ship arrived and docked, and some passengers were stretchered off the ship.
The incident was just three months before I was to be taking my first ocean cruise - on Viking Jupiter - in the same area. While the incident was scary as an observer - and I'm sure plenty more so for those onboard - I found it greatly reassuring how the whole situation was handled by all involved as reported by those who were actually there.
I'm happy to say that we hugely enjoyed our completely uneventful Midnight Sun cruise in June. Norway is beautiful, and Viking does it quite well.

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[OnTheJourney]

I know several passengers reported the nearly indescribable feeling coming into Molde, as the local people were gathered to watch the Sky come into port. Very emotional time I'm sure. We were probably among the first off the ship. Will never forget the sight of the Sky slipping from our view once our helicopter was loaded and we went on our way to the evacuation center. 

[Heidi13]

4 hours ago, OnTheJourney said:

In the report, it indicates that at 14:06 and 14:20 the anchors were put out; however, it also says that (apparently) neither anchor held and the ship continued to drift, and then at some point after 14:29 it states the ship was maneuvered towards open waters "still with both anchors lowered". So is this to indicate that the anchors never did actually hold as intended? We were in the theatre at the time and could hear what sounded like more than one attempt with the anchors. It is indeed scary looking at the map, especially our position at the 14:36 mark where we were in "shallow contour" of 5m depth. I think it's safe to say this event would have gone really bad without regaining some engine power. Whatever happened with the anchors? I had heard somewhere along the way that they had to cut the one line and never retrieved an anchor? 

The Interim Report is again devoid of details when discussing the use of anchors. It states the Master requested both anchors, but the chartlet shows them released 14 minutes apart. Additional details are required.

 

In this type of situation, the anchors can be the Captain's best friend, but they do have limitations. The effectiveness is greatly impacted by the bottom. Unfortunately the chart reports the bottom to be rock, which has very poor holding characteristics. Many believe the anchor actually holds the ship, but it really only pulls the chain down. The chain laid along the bottom is what predominantly holds the ship at anchor.

 

The other consideration is the ship was reported to be drifting at 6 to 7 kts, even with the anchor(s) in the water; therefore, I expect the initial drift rate could have been higher. At that speed, with a rock bottom, the anchor(s) were never going to stop the ship and bring it up to the anchor. The best outcome was dragging the anchor and retarding the drift, to provide additional time to resolve the engine issues. This will be why the Master elected to use 900 feet of chain in only 100 feet of water. 

 

When both anchors are let go in an emergency on a ship Not Under Command, the potential for fouling them is very high, so the loss of one or both anchors in this situation was not unexpected.

 

When letting the anchor go, for 10 shackles you could not let it out in all at once, as the risk of the brake not slowing and stopping the cable going out is high. Seeing the bitter end disappearing down the hawse pipe is not a pleasant sight. Therefore, the anchor will be let out multiple times, which is what you heard in the Theatre. This basic seamanship. When breaking the chain, we would attach a float and sufficient line that it reaches the surface. This permits the anchor to be retrieved at a later date.

[just_dont]

The Interim Report is again devoid of details when discussing the use of anchors. It states the Master requested both anchors, but the chartlet shows them released 14 minutes apart. Additional details are required.
 
In this type of situation, the anchors can be the Captain's best friend, but they do have limitations. The effectiveness is greatly impacted by the bottom. Unfortunately the chart reports the bottom to be rock, which has very poor holding characteristics. Many believe the anchor actually holds the ship, but it really only pulls the chain down. The chain laid along the bottom is what predominantly holds the ship at anchor.
 
The other consideration is the ship was reported to be drifting at 6 to 7 kts, even with the anchor(s) in the water; therefore, I expect the initial drift rate could have been higher. At that speed, with a rock bottom, the anchor(s) were never going to stop the ship and bring it up to the anchor. The best outcome was dragging the anchor and retarding the drift, to provide additional time to resolve the engine issues. This will be why the Master elected to use 900 feet of chain in only 100 feet of water. 
 
When both anchors are let go in an emergency on a ship Not Under Command, the potential for fouling them is very high, so the loss of one or both anchors in this situation was not unexpected.
 
When letting the anchor go, for 10 shackles you could not let it out in all at once, as the risk of the brake not slowing and stopping the cable going out is high. Seeing the bitter end disappearing down the hawse pipe is not a pleasant sight. Therefore, the anchor will be let out multiple times, which is what you heard in the Theatre. This basic seamanship. When breaking the chain, we would attach a float and sufficient line that it reaches the surface. This permits the anchor to be retrieved at a later date.

Thanks for the insight. I suspected some of this. I'd wondered about the "10 shackles" reference. I'd also wondered exactly how an anchor would actually be let go. Is the bitter end attached, such that the chain (or attachment) actually needs to be physically broken?
I truly do appreciate your experience-based perspective, as well as that of the other former mariners on these boards. And I'm still eager to get the Chief's perspective on the report.

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